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Introduction
Key Points Poor ballot design frustrates voters, undermines 
confi dence in the electoral process, and contributes 
to related Election Day problems.
Tens or hundreds of thousands of votes are lost or 
miscast in every election year as a result of poorly 
designed ballots.
All voters are at some risk for lost or 
misrecorded votes.
The risk is greater for particular groups of 
citizens, including older voters, new voters, 
and low-income voters.
All voting technologies are affected.
The recommendations in this report are timely: 
many can be implemented, relatively easily — before 
the November election.
9The notorious butterfl y ballot that Palm Beach County, Florida election offi cials used in 
the 2000 election is probably the most infamous of all election design snafus. It was one 
of many political, legal, and election administration missteps that plunged a presidential 
election into turmoil and set off a series of events that led to, among other things, a vast 
overhaul of the country’s election administration, including the greatest change in voting 
technology in United States history.
Yet, ironically, eight years after the 2000 election, and billions of dollars spent on new 
voting technology, the problems caused by poor ballot design have not been fully and 
effectively addressed on a national level. Year in and year out, we see the same mistakes in 
ballot design, with the same results: tens, and sometimes hundreds, of thousands of voters 
disenfranchised by confusing ballot design and instructions, sometimes raising serious 
questions about whether the intended choice of the voters was certifi ed as the winner.
Problems with voting technology have, rightly, attracted much public attention. Scores 
of independent reports — including a major study published by the Brennan Center — 
have documented the vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines.1 More importantly, 
voting system failures lead to long lines on Election Day, voters being turned away at the 
polls, and lost votes.2 These are serious problems, and we must do what we can to ensure 
that poor technology and procedures do not continue to disenfranchise voters.
At the same time, when it comes to ensuring that votes are accurately recorded and tal-
lied, there is a respectable argument that poor ballot design and confusing instructions 
have resulted in far more lost votes than software glitches, programming errors, or machine 
breakdowns. As this report demonstrates, poor ballot design and instructions have caused 
the loss of tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of votes in nearly every election year.
While all groups of voters are affected by poorly designed ballots and badly drafted instruc-
tions, these problems disproportionately affect low-income voters, new voters, and elderly 
voters. All too often, the loss of votes and rate of errors resulting from these mistakes are 
greater than the margin of victory between the two leading candidates. As the examples in 
this report show, problems caused by poor ballot design and instructions recur in American 
elections, regardless of the type of voting technology a jurisdiction has used.
Some have dismissed the degree to which poor ballot design undermines democracy by 
arguing that voters only have themselves to blame if they fail to properly navigate design 
fl aws.3 This is unfair. Candidates should win or lose elections based upon whether or not 
An election is not held 
to test voters’ ability to 
follow instructions, but to 
receive instructions from 
the voters as to which can-
didates they will elect. No 
legitimate public purpose 
is served by designs that 
distort those instructions.
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they are preferred by a majority of voters, not on whether they have the largest number of 
supporters who — as a result of education and experience — have greater facility navigating 
unnecessarily complicated interfaces or complex instructions, or because fewer of their sup-
porters are elderly or have reading disabilities. Nor should candidates win elections because 
ballot designs happened to make it more diffi cult for voters supporting their opponents to 
accurately cast their votes.4 
Many voters will be presented with a new voting system for the fi rst time in 2008. 
For these voters in particular, usable ballot designs and instructions will be important. 
For further information about these voters, see the Appendix of this report.
Registered Voters Living in Counties with New 
Voting Systems5        15,194,476
Number of Voting-Age Persons Moving Annually6    29,141,000
Approximate Number of Newly Registered Voters 
in First Three Months of 20087      3,500,000
Fortunately, avoiding the design blunders that have cost so many votes in the past need 
not be particularly complicated, time consuming, or expensive. In recent months, there 
have been several efforts to reexamine how voting technology can be made more usable, 
to ensure that voters’ choices are accurately recorded.
 In June 2007, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (the “EAC”) published Effec-
tive Designs for the Administration of Federal Elections, several hundred pages of guidelines 
intended to assist election offi cials in designing more usable election materials. The EAC 
report was prepared by Design for Democracy, an initiative of AIGA, which also published 
a book on effective ballot design.8 
In October 2007, Professors David Kimball and Martha Kropf, two of the nation’s leading 
academics in the area of ballot usability, published Dos and Don’ts of Ballot Design for the 
AEI/Brookings Election Reform Project.9 In that report, they listed twelve ballot features to 
avoid and provided historical examples of how these features have previously led to thou-
sands of “residual” votes.
In 2008, the Brookings Institution published a book by several academics called Voting 
Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot, which sought to use empirical 
research to quantify voters’ reactions to different voting systems, including their ability to 
use these technologies to accurately cast their intended choices.10
11
 A new draft of the EAC’s Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (“VVSG”) (currently being 
reviewed) will establish new federal standards for voting systems of all kinds. It includes 
some requirements for good design, but unfortunately does not require vendors to fully 
support the ballot design recommendations made in Effective Designs for the Administra-
tion of Federal Elections.11
Election offi cials evince a growing interest in better ballot design. Design for Democracy 
has worked on election materials in Illinois, Nebraska and Oregon, and election offi cials 
report that their conferences increasingly focus on ballot design and usability.12
We encourage election offi cials, policy makers, and concerned members of the public to re-
view these documents and continue to work with experts to help ensure better ballot design 
in their communities. This report is intended to complement those documents and efforts 
by providing an easy-to-use guide that will allow state and local election offi cials to avoid 
the kinds of design mistakes we have seen in every election year in the last decade, while 
maximizing the likelihood that voters’ intended choices are accurately recorded.
In a few months, our nation will hold what many believe is our most important election 
in a generation. Millions of Americans will cast their votes for the fi rst time. While there 
is much that can and should be done prior to the general election to ensure that voting is 
as secure as possible, it is neither likely nor desirable for many jurisdictions to make major 
changes to their voting equipment or Election Day procedures in the remaining months 
before November.
However, in the next few months, every state and county can take simple steps to avoid 
poorly designed ballots and help prevent another Palm Beach County 2000, Cuyahoga 
County 2004, Sarasota County 2006, Los Angeles County 2008, or any of the many other 
ballot design problems detailed in this report, which have disenfranchised hundreds of 
thousands of voters, and — all too frequently — left citizens wondering whether various 
elections provided an accurate measure of voters’ intentions.
12
Findings
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Our review of ballot design and instructions, and state practices and 
requirements related to ballot design, lead to three key conclusions:
Poor ballot design and instructions have led to the disenfranchisement of hundreds of 
thousands of voters in the last several federal elections. In nearly every election, we have 
seen ballot design mistakes repeated. There is compelling evidence that when basic usabil-
ity principles are ignored in the design of ballots and drafting of instructions, a signifi cant 
percentage of voters will be disenfranchised, and the affected voters will disproportionately be 
poor, minority, elderly and disabled voters.
A lack of clear and consistent ballot design guidance from federal and state governments 
contributes to differing residual and miscast vote rates from county to county, state to 
state. Frequently, counties within the same state have created different ballot designs for the 
same federal and statewide races. All too often, poor ballot design in one county has contribut-
ed to dramatically higher rates of lost or miscast votes than in other counties with better ballot 
designs. Similarly, poor ballot designs or instructions in one state may lead to higher residual 
vote rates in that state than in other states with similar populations.
Usability testing is the best way to make sure that voters can use the ballot successfully, 
confi dent that they actually voted for the candidates and positions they intended to vote 
for. Usability testing allows election offi cials to observe individual voters using a ballot — 
before the election — in order to see where they have problems. This allows election offi cials 
to analyze the design and language choices to determine the cause of those problems. They 
can then redesign and rewrite the ballot to eliminate those problems — before the election. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of jurisdictions do not conduct usability testing of their bal-
lots before an election. Of course, all ballots will eventually receive a usability test — on Elec-
tion Day. At that point, unfortunately, fi nding out that a ballot is confusing to voters is most 
unwelcome news. Our hope is that by testing ballots before Election Day, election offi cials 
will make adjustments to ballots and avoid the kinds of design problems that result in lost or 
miscast votes. In our examination of the laws of all fi fty states, we did not fi nd any require-
ment for usability testing.
There are a number of steps that the federal government, states, and counties can take to 
improve their ballot design and instructions and avoid debacles of the sort we have seen in the 
last several elections. We’ve focused on steps that can be taken at the state and county level in 
time to affect the November 2008 election.
At the state and county level, we recommend the following actions:
Develop a checklist of design best practices for ballot designers. A good place to start is 
with the generic checklist provided in this report at page 16 , to avoid the kinds of design 
mistakes we have seen made repeatedly in the last several years (illustrations of these mis-
takes can be found in Ballot Design Problems of this report). This checklist can be adjusted 
to meet local laws and equipment capabilities. When possible, election offi cials should seek 
help from professional information designers, simple language writers, and usability experts 
to apply guidelines and checklists to the design of ballots and related instructions.
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Conduct usability testing of ballots before fi nalizing the design and instructions. 
Usability testing of ballots is the best way to ensure that a particular design does not lead 
to unnecessary voter errors. In the past, election offi cials may have believed that demands 
on their time and budgets made usability testing of ballots an unrealistic option. Today, as 
discussed in Policy Recommendations of this report, it is possible to conduct valuable usability 
studies of ballots in a matter of hours, without having to hire experts, with the defi nite effect 
of reducing the likelihood of voter errors.
 Actively publicize sample ballots that look like the ballots voters will use at their poll-
ing places. Publicize ballots ahead of an election, by sending them to local party leaders, 
business leaders, non-profi t organizations, civil rights groups, universities, etc. Ideally, these 
sample ballots will also be posted on the web and sent to all registered voters.13 If sample 
ballots show the same layout and design as the actual ballots used at the polling place, early 
publicity will provide voters with an opportunity to become familiar with the ballot, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood that they will make errors on Election Day. Furthermore, by 
providing sample ballots to a wide range of groups ahead of time, election offi cials increase 
the likelihood that they will be warned of ballot design fl aws before Election Day, thereby 
giving them an opportunity to change their ballots and/or educate voters about poten-
tial problems when they arrive at polling places to vote. Unfortunately, all too frequently, 
sample ballots sent to voters do not look like the ballots used on Election Day.14
If usability testing or the publication of sample ballots identifi es problems with ballot 
design, make necessary changes. In our historical review of poor ballot designs that led to 
high numbers of lost or miscast votes, we found that merely recognizing that a ballot design 
was fl awed was not enough to prevent big problems on Election Day. While it is prefer-
able to warn voters of design fl aws than to ignore them, in the best case scenario, counties 
will conduct usability tests and publish sample ballots early enough so that if problems are 
discovered, the fl awed ballot design and/or instructions can be changed.
At the state level, the following actions could lead to better 
ballots for voters:
Create ballot design guidelines and templates for each brand and model of voting 
system. Since 2000, the Florida Secretary of State has developed detailed ballot design 
regulations for each brand and model of voting system used in the state.15 These regulations 
include images of sample ballots that can be used as templates by the counties.16 We encour-
age other states to adopt this practice. State offi ces can also create samples or templates that 
can be adapted by the counties. For example, the Oregon Secretary of State’s offi ce employs 
a designer who works on all election materials, including all materials voters use.17 
Review county ballot designs. The Secretary of State or other chief election offi cial can se-
lect a full-time employee or outside expert to review county ballots. This will allow overbur-
dened counties to get a “second set of eyes” to review ballot designs. It is a general principle 
in both the graphic design and programming communities that it is extremely diffi cult for 
someone who worked on a design to review it effectively.
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Require counties to report the number of overvotes, undervotes, and spoiled ballots. 
This reporting, including explanations for rejected ballots — especially when residual vote 
rates for particular races or ballot items are unusually high — would allow Secretaries of 
State and other interested groups to determine whether certain ballot designs cause voter 
confusion and high error rates, and allow them to ensure that similar designs are not em-
ployed in the future.18
Review and amend election laws that prevent counties from employing the most 
usable ballot designs. Sometimes, counties are precluded from employing better ballot 
designs because of restrictive ballot design requirements in state law. Similarly, in making 
changes to state election laws and regulations unrelated to ballots, offi cials should carefully 
consider the potential impact they may have on ballot design and usability. Later in this 
report, we look at some state laws that could be changed to make it easier for counties to 
develop more usable ballots.
While the federal government is unlikely to take steps in the coming months that will have 
much impact on what ballots look like November, there are some steps that we believe the 
Election Assistance Commission (the “EAC”) can take in the coming months. A federal 
commission, the EAC has the authority to develop election-related standards for state and 
local governments and serve as national clearinghouse of election information. (We discuss 
other potential roles for the federal government in Directions for the Future)
Ensure that new voting system guidelines include requirements that support good 
ballot design. A real frustration for some state and county election offi cials in the last 
few years is that their machines are often not fl exible enough to allow for the best ballot 
designs and instructions. The EAC must do more to ensure that all future voting systems 
are required to give election offi cials the ability and latitude to employ good ballot design 
and usability principles. One place to start would be amending the Voluntary Voting System 
Guidelines to require vendors to produce systems that can satisfy the EAC’s own ballot de-
sign recommendations in Effective Designs for the Administration of Federal Elections.
Put a greater emphasis on ballot design in the EAC’s role as a clearinghouse of elec-
tion information and resources for local election offi cials. The EAC could post images 
of all types of ballots, from every county, on its website. This would allow election offi cials 
from around the country to see how other states and counties address challenging ballot 
issues through ballot design.
With the exception of changing state laws, none of these recommended actions for states 
and counties should require a large expenditure of resources (in time, money, or personnel). 
At the same time, as the following pages demonstrate, their implementation could save hun-
dreds of thousands of votes, and help the country avoid some of the most painful Election 
Day fi ascos that several states and counties have already endured in the last decade.
Ballot instructions should be brief, simple, and clear.
Paper ballots:
Display general instructions in the top left-hand corner of the ballot. Place specifi c 
instructions and related actions together. Do not put all instructions at the beginning 
of the ballot.
Let voters know that if they make a mistake, they can get a new ballot. Include this 
information in the initial instructions.
Electronic ballots:
Display startup instructions in an easy-to-spot location in the voting booth.
Place specifi c instructions and related actions together. Do not put all instructions 
at the beginning of the ballot.
 Instruct voters to review their selections and provide clear instructions on how to 
change a selection and cast the ballot.
All ballots:
In instructions for write-in votes, state plainly that voters should not vote for both a named 
candidate and a write-in a candidate for the same offi ce.
Write instructions in an active voice and in positive terms. (“Fill in the oval for your write-in 
vote to count,” rather than, “If the oval is not marked, your vote cannot be counted for the 
write-in candidate.”)
Use common, easily understood words. (“Move to the next page of the ballot,” or “Move to 
the next screen,” rather than “Navigate forward through the ballot.”)
Provide the context of the action fi rst, then the action. (“[Context] To vote for the candidate of 
your choice, [Action] fi ll the oval to the left of the candidate’s name.”) 
Place each instruction on its own line.
 
In designing your ballot, ensure that it satisfi es the following guidelines:
Ballot Design 
Checklist
Don’t split contests.
List all candidates for the same race on the same page and in the same column.
Remove the entire column or row for any candidate or party that has been 
withdrawn or disqualifi ed (not just the candidate or party name).
Make sure ballot design is consistent.
Use consistent format and style for every contest and voting action.
Use consistent font type, letter-size, and shading for all contests.
Place response options (such as fi ll-in ovals) in a consistent place on the ballot, such as one 
side of candidate names or ballot question choices.
Make ballots easy to understand visually.
Paper ballots:
Use the fi ll-the-oval, rather than the connect-the-arrow, method of selecting 
a choice in a contest.
Electronic ballots:
Try to place only one contest on each screen, at least for federal and statewide races.
All ballots:
Use fl ush-left text, instead of centered text.
Display all text in mixed case, rather than all capital letters.
Use a simple and easy-to-read font, such as Arial or Univers.
Bold and/or shade certain text, such as offi ce names.
Use a legible, minimum text size, meeting VVSG requirements, such as 12 points.
Eliminate extraneous information (e.g., candidate’s hometown, occupation, etc.), 
or design it to avoid visual clutter.
Give voters maximum fl exibility.
Electronic ballots:
Allow voters to select or change the language of the ballot at any time during 
the voting process.
Allow voters to change text size and contrast levels and to get audio support at 
any time during the voting process.
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Confusing ballot layouts led to some of the most well-known Election Day problems of the 
last decade, including several where the residual vote rate was larger than the margin of victory. 
In this report, we look at how ballot design problems have affected a group of federal and 
state races, mostly between 2000 and 2008.
“Residual” or “lost” votes “are typically calculated as the difference between the number of 
people voting and the number of valid votes cast for a particular offi ce. Residual votes can 
be undervotes (not selecting any choice on the ballot, either accidentally or intentionally) or 
overvotes (selecting too many choices, usually accidentally).”19
Residual vote rates of more than 1% for “top-of-the-ticket” races, particularly for Presi-
dent, are unusual.20 They are not a perfect measure of voter error; many voters may make 
errors by selecting a candidate they did not intend to vote for without undervoting or 
overvoting, and some voters may decide to skip a race altogether. But unusually high 
residual vote rates serve as the best available post-election evidence that something went 
wrong, and that the vote totals may not accurately refl ect the will of the voters. As the 
authors and the Brennan Center Task Force on Ballot Design discovered, when we look 
at contests with unusually high residual vote rates (particularly top-of-the-ticket contests), 
we invariably fi nd poor and confusing ballot designs.
Signifi cantly, several studies indicate that residual vote rates are higher in low-income and 
minority communities and among the elderly, and, in addition, that improvements in voting 
equipment and ballot design produce substantial drops in residual vote rates in such commu-
nities.21 As a result, the failure of a voting system to protect against residual votes is likely to 
harm low-income and minority voters, as well as the elderly, more severely than other commu-
nities. When residual vote rates exceed the margin of victory between candidates (as occurred 
in many of the examples discussed below), the result is that the integrity of elections can be 
called into doubt, as it becomes unclear that the winning candidate was actually the intended 
choice of a majority of the voters.
We have used residual vote rates for instructional purposes.22 We do not claim that the poor 
designs we examine disenfranchised all of the voters who did not record a vote for a particular 
contest. For the most part, we compare rates in a single county with an obvious ballot design 
fl aw to rates statewide, or from one county to another (where one county ballot has obvious 
fl aws and the other does not). The variances may be attributable to ballot design; they may 
also be attributed to different demographics from one location to the next, or local interest in 
a political contest. In most cases, the differences are probably attributable to a combination of 
these factors.
Nevertheless, the strong correlation between fl awed ballot design and instructions on the 
one hand, and high residual vote rates on the other, is diffi cult to deny. Invariably, when the 
authors and the Brennan Center Task Force on Ballot Design reviewed ballots in counties with 
unusually high residual vote rates, we found a poor design, poorly worded instructions, or 
(very often) both.
We have identifi ed 13 ballot problems. Each is illustrated with actual ballots and the results 
from actual elections.
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Problem 1
Palm Beach County, Florida
2000 General Election
Affected Race: President
  
Splitting candidates for the same offi ce 
onto different pages or columns
“I was trying to make 
the print bigger so elderly 
people in Palm Beach 
County can read it.”
—  Theresa LePore, 
Supervisor of Elections, 
Palm Beach County
Example: The ‘Butterfl y Ballot’
Residual Vote Rate (in county)            6.2%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 2.9%
Residual Votes (in county)     28,746 votes
Margin of Victory (in state)         537 votes
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The most famous example of this design fl aw is the “butterfl y ballot” used in Palm Beach 
County, Florida during the 2000 presidential election. In a presidential contest decided 
by fewer than 600 votes, nearly 29,000 ballots in Palm Beach County, or 4% of all ballots 
cast in the county, were not counted because voters either chose more than one candidate 
or chose none.23
This design was part of a decision to increase the size of the words to help older voters, 
who often have trouble reading smaller text. Unfortunately, this pushed the presidential 
race into two columns, resulting in a higher than normal residual vote rate — a problem 
that was not evident until voters tried to actually use the ballots.
The problem: The vast majority of overvotes and undervotes were almost certainly due to 
voter confusion resulting from poorly designed ballots that listed candidates in the presi-
dential race across two pages, in an open book type format, and included holes down the 
center, on which voters could punch out their selections.24 George W. Bush and Al Gore 
were listed as the fi rst and second candidates on the left-hand page; Pat Buchanan was the 
fi rst candidate listed on the right-hand page. Voters reading the ballot in traditional book-
form, i.e., from top left to bottom left, followed by top right to bottom right, likely read 
Gore as the second name and punched the second hole without realizing that the second 
hole corresponded with a vote for Buchanan.
The result: Pat Buchanan received 3,411 votes in Palm Beach County — more than three 
times what he received in other Florida counties.25 The butterfl y ballot likely caused more 
than 2,000 Democratic voters to mistakenly vote for Pat Buchanan.26
 
 
In the same 2000 presidential election, Duval County, Florida used a different two-page design.
The problem: As on the Palm Beach ballot, candidates for the same race were listed on sepa-
rate pages. The ten presidential candidates were listed on two pages, fi ve on the fi rst and fi ve 
on the second. This ballot was used in an area “where Democrats had mounted an intensive 
effort to register new voters.” 27 The voter education materials included a reminder to be sure 
to “vote that second place.”
The result: Nearly 22,000 votes were thrown out because voters voted for one candidate 
on the fi rst page and another candidate on the second.28 More than 40% of these were 
concentrated in four predominantly black council districts in Jacksonville, Florida.
Example: Multiple Pages for One Contest
Duval County, Florida
2000 General Election
Affected Race: President
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 9.3%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 2.9%
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Example: Candidates Listed in Two Columns
Kewaunee County, Wisconsin
2002 General Election
Affected Race: Governor
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 11.8%
Residual Vote Rate (in state)   1.1%
The problem: Just two years later, in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin, voters were presented 
with a ballot that divided the Governor’s race into two columns.
The result: Not surprisingly, the Kewaunee County ballot led to many mistakes in the 
Governor’s race, with an astounding 11.8% of voters recording no vote for this race (in 
contrast to a 1.1% residual vote rate statewide for this race). No doubt, many of these lost 
votes were caused because voters selected one candidate from the fi rst column and one 
from the second, rendering their vote in the Governor’s race invalid.
Jim Doyle won the state by a comfortable margin, but the more than 700 residual votes 
in Kewaunee County apparently caused by this poor ballot design far exceeded the 400 
vote margin between the two gubernatorial candidates in the county.
Just two years after 
the Palm Beach County 
ballot design debacle, 
and the same year as the 
Help America Vote Act 
was passed, Kewaunee 
County, Wisconsin used 
a ballot that listed 
candidates for Governor 
in two different columns. 
The residual vote rate for 
the Governor’s race 
in Kewaunee County 
was nearly eleven times 
the rate in the rest of 
the state.
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Write In
Write In
Write In
Statewide Congressional
Governor/Lieutenant Governor
Vote for One
Jim Doyle/Barbara Lawton
Democratic
Scott McCallum/
Margaret A Farrow 
Democratic
Democratic
Republican
Wisconsin Greens
Libertarian
Constitution
Jim Young/Jeff Peterson
Wisconsin Greens
Ed Thompson / Marty Reynolds
Libertarian
Attorney General
Vote for One
Peggy A. Lautenschlager
Democratic
Vince Biskupic
Republican
Edward J. Framl
Constitution Party
Secretary of State
Vote for One
Douglas La Follette
Democratic
Robert Gerald Lorge
Republican
Alan D. Eisenberg
Reform Party
Ty A. Bollerud
Reform Party
Mike Mangan
Guerilla Attack on State Spending
Aneb Jah Rasta 
Sensas-Utcha Nefer-I 
(The Rasta Movement)
Kewaunee County
State of Wisconsin
November 5, 2002
Official Ballot
For Partisan Office & Referendum
Write In
Represenative in Congress 
District #8
Vote for One
Legislative and State
State Senator
District #1
Vote for One
Andrew M. Becker
Democratic
Mark Green
Republican
Dick Kaiser
Wisconsin Greeens
Susan Hilsabeck
Democratic
Alan J. Lasee
Republican
Write In
Representative to the Assembly
District #1
Vote for One
Tom Hermann
Democratic
Garey D. Bies
Republican
Write In
Troy C. Dalebroux
Democratic
To continue voting please turn ballot over
Write In
Write In
State Treasurer
Vote for One
District Attorney
Vote for One
Paul Aschenbrenner
Wisconsin Greens
Dawn Marie Sass
Democratic
Jack C. Voight
Republican
Notice to Electors:
This ballot may be invalid unless initialed by 
2 election inspectors. If cast as an absentee 
ballot, this ballot must bear the initials of the 
municipal clerk or deputy clerk. 
Instructions for Voters:
Use a number 2 pencil only.
To vote, fill in the oval next to your choice, 
like this:
To vote for a person whose name is not on 
the ballot, write the person’s full name in the 
blank space, and fill in the oval next to it.
If you make a mistake or want to change 
your vote, ask a poll worker for a new ballot.
Straight Party
If you desire to vote a straight party ticket 
for all state, congressional, legislative, and 
county offices, fill in the oval to the left of 
the party below. 
You cannot cast a straight party vote for 
independent candidates.
To vote for individual candidates fill in the 
oval next to your choice. 
Existing Ballot Re-designed Ballot
Includes our recommendation for the use of fi ll-the-oval 
instead of complete-the-arrow response method. Not all 
machines can read ovals.
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Problem 2 Placing different contests on the
same touch screen
With paper ballots, it is best to display candidates for the same offi ce on the same page or 
column; similarly, it is best, when using electronic ballots, to place candidates for just one 
race on a single computer screen. This is a basic principle of interface usability: automated 
teller machines and movie kiosks generally ask one question at a time and proceed to a new 
screen only after the user has answered the question on a previous screen. (For example, 
ATM machines ask the user, fi rst to “Enter PIN Number,” then, after the PIN number is 
entered, proceeds to the next screen and asks the user to “Select Account for Withdrawal”) 
There is a simple reason for this kind of structure: people are far more likely to miss ques-
tions if they are asked to answer more than one at a time.
Two races in Sarasota and Charlotte Counties, Florida provide an instructive lesson 
in the dangers of putting more than one race on the same page.
Example: Placing Two Contests on One Screen 
Sarasota County, Florida
2006 General Election
Affected Race: 
U.S. Representative
Problem Ballot: Sarasota County  
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 13.9%
Residual Vote Rate (in Cong. district) 2.5%
Residual Votes (in county) 18,413 votes
Margin of Victory (in Cong. district) 369 votes
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In the race to replace Katherine Harris in Congress, offi cials declared Republican Vern 
Buchanan the victor over Democrat Christine Jennings by a margin of less than 400 
votes.30 There is a very strong likelihood that the ballot design affected the outcome of the 
Congressional contest.31
The problem: The electronic interface displayed candidates for the Congressional district 
race on the same screen with candidates for the Governor/Lt. Governor’s race. Undoubt-
edly the problems that arose as a result of this violation of the principle that electronic 
interfaces should display one contest at a time were exacerbated by the fact that the word 
“STATE,” in highlighted blue letters, drew voters’ attention away from the fi rst race and 
towards the second.
The result: More than 14,000 of the voters presented with this ballot cast invalid votes in 
the race, for a residual rate of 13.9%. Undervote rates were signifi cantly higher in La Casa 
Mobile Home Park, a retirement community for seniors, where 30% of votes cast on 
DREs were not recorded in the Congressional district race.32
The County Supervisor of Elections instructed poll workers to warn voters not to miss 
this race,33 but the residual vote rate for Election Day voters was much higher than the 
residual vote rate for Sarasota County voters who cast absentee and provisional ballots 
(2.5%) or in neighboring Charlotte County which displayed the Congressional district 
race on its own page (2.5%).34 
Better Ballot: Charlotte County29
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Example: Placing Two Contests on One Screen
Charlotte County, Florida
2006 General Election
Affected Race: Attorney General
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 20.9%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 4.9%
Charlotte County Ballot Page 34
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While there have been 
several credible theories 
offered for the cause of 
the high residual vote 
rate in the Congressional 
race in Sarasota County 
in 2006, it is undeniable 
that the ballot design 
employed in this race has 
correlated with high re-
sidual vote rates in other 
contests.
The problem: Although Charlotte County avoided high residual vote rates in the 
Congressional district race by displaying just that contest on a single page, the County 
deviated from this practice on ballot pages for state races, placing the gubernatorial and 
attorney general races on the same page in a layout very similar to the one employed for 
the Congressional and gubernatorial races in Sarasota County.
The result: The residual vote rate in Charlotte County for the attorney general race was 
20.9%, compared to 4.3% in Sarasota County. Statewide, the residual vote rate for the 
attorney general race was 4.9%.
Again, poor ballot design and instructions was almost certainly a major factor 
(and probably the major factor) causing the high undervote rate.
Within days of the polls’ closing in Sarasota County in 2006, there was rampant specu-
lation that some kind of software or hardware problem had caused the large undervote 
rate.36 In response, the United States Government Accountability Offi ce (“GAO”) con-
ducted three tests to determine whether there was an “equipment malfunction” in Sara-
sota County on Election Day. Based on these tests, the GAO concluded that there was no 
equipment malfunction.37 The GAO added that the undervotes might be explained “by 
factors such as voters who unintentionally undervoted, or voters who did not properly 
cast their ballots on the iVotronic DRE, potentially because of issues related to interaction 
between voters and the ballot.”38 Surely there is a difference between these alternatives.
Interestingly, the GAO made no recommendation for further analysis. Implying, perhaps 
inadvertently, that the voters themselves were to blame for the undervotes, the GAO 
requested no further investigation into the question of whether ballot design played a part 
in the high undervote rate. 
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The problem: The races at the top of the fi rst and second columns line up exactly. 
Reading left-to-right, many voters mistakenly marked the arrow to the right of a can-
didate’s name instead of the arrows to the left. Although the ballot instructions direct 
voters to complete the arrows to the left of their choices, there are few visual cues on 
the page. The small amount of space between columns makes it hard for voters to tell 
which arrow corresponds with the candidate for whom they’d like to vote.
One way to address this problem would have been to visually “box” the candidates with 
their respective response arrows, or to provide a clear space between the columns. Either 
would have decreased the likelihood of voter error.
The result: The residual vote rate for the U.S. Senate race in Hamilton County was 9.3%, 
compared to the statewide rate of 4.5%. This problem also affected the Governor’s race. 
Hamilton County had a 5.0% residual vote in that race, compared to 3.1% statewide.
Placing response options for voters on both sides of a candidate’s name is a problem 
that is often presented by optical scan ballots which tend to list two or three columns of 
offi ces and candidate names on a single page. This may have confused voters in Illinois’ 
Hamilton County in 2002.
Problem 3 Placing response options on both sides 
of candidate names
Example: Arrows on Both Sides of a Candidate’s Name
Hamilton County, Illinois
2002 General Election
Affected Race: U.S. Senate
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 9.3%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 4.5%
Affected Race: Governor
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 5.0%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 3.1%
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Write In
Federal 
For United States Senator
Vote for One 
Richard J. Durbin
Democratic
Jim Durkin
Republican
Steven Burgauer
Liberatarian
Write In
State
For Secretary of State
Vote for One
Jesse White
Democratic
Kris O’Rourke Cohn
Republican
Matt Beauchamp
Liberatarian
Existing Ballot
Existing Ballot
with minor change.
Re-designed ballot: 
includes our recom-
mendation for the use 
of fi ll-the-oval instead 
of complete-the-arrow 
response method. 
Not all machines can
read ovals.
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Some optical scan systems require voters to “complete-the-arrow” to cast a vote, 
rather than “fi ll-the-oval.”
Problem 4 Using “complete-the-arrow” instead 
of “fi ll-the-oval”  response options 
Polk County, Iowa 200239
Dallas County, Iowa 2002
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Table 1: Residual Votes in Optical Scan Ballots by Type of Voting
Mark in the 2004 Presidential Election41 
Another design element 
that makes fi ll-in ovals 
better than arrows is that 
on the ballot page, they 
are closer in proximity to 
the choice to be marked 
than arrows are. It is 
easier to see where to vote 
for whom because hori-
zontal alignment issues 
are minimal, especially for 
paired races, such as that 
for President and Vice 
President.
Voting System Type Fill-the-Oval Complete-the-Arrow
Precinct Count Optical Scan 0.6% 0.9%
Central Count Optical Scan  1.6% 2.3%
It is likely that the difference was greater when jurisdictions use central count optical 
scan machines because voters who use these machines don’t have the opportunity to 
correct errors on their ballots, even those the scan machines catch, since these machines 
are generally used to count votes that have been cast elsewhere (in a polling place or 
absentee).
In total, we estimate that roughly 45,000 extra residual votes were cast in the 2004 
presidential election due to use of the connect-the-arrow feature.42 
The problem: Filling in ovals or bubbles is a more familiar task than completing an arrow, 
since standardized tests, lottery tickets and other commonly used forms include fi ll-in-
the-oval response systems. Nationally, complete-the-arrow ballots result in higher rates of 
residual votes, and substantially higher rates of overvotes.40 
The result: During the 2004 general election, ballots that required voters to darken an 
oval produced a residual vote rate of 0.6% on precinct count optical scan machines, while 
those that required voters to connect an arrow with a line to a candidate produced a rate 
of 0.9%.
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Problem 5 Leaving columns or rows for 
disqualifi ed candidates
Election offi cials commonly change ballots in the weeks before an election since candi-
dates sometimes withdraw after deadlines have passed or are disqualifi ed as a result of a 
legal challenge. In the Ohio 2004 general election, Ralph Nader was disqualifi ed from the 
presidential ballot by Secretary Blackwell on September 29, and this decision was upheld 
by the Ohio Supreme Court on October 25, just one week before Election Day.43 
When possible, jurisdictions should, in these circumstances, entirely remove the rows or 
columns in which a candidate was to appear. To see why, it is worthwhile to examine the 
November 2004 ballot in Montgomery County, Ohio.
Example: “Candidate Removed” Placed as Third of Five Candidates on the Ballot
Montgomery County, Ohio
2004 General Election
Affected Race: President
Overvote Vote Rate
(with this ballot rotation) 2.6%
Overvote Vote Rate
(with other ballot rotations) 1.1%
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The problem: Ohio law requires election offi cials to rotate, by precinct, the names of can-
didates for each race.44 But, by the time Nader was disqualifi ed in 2004, many counties in 
Ohio had already programmed their scan machines to read ballots that included Nader as 
a candidate.45 As a result, several counties placed the words “Candidate Removed” in the 
row in which Ralph Nader would have appeared. This caused many lost votes in Ohio.
The result: In every fi fth precinct in Montgomery County, Ohio, the ballot looked like 
the one reproduced above, on which two well-known candidates (Bush and Kerry) ap-
peared fi rst, followed by “Candidate Removed,” followed by two lesser known candidates 
(Peroutka and Badnarik). Much higher overvoting resulted in precincts with this order; 
presumably, some voters viewed this presentation of the race as two races — the fi rst 
between Bush and Kerry, the second between Peroutka and Badnarik. By voting in “both” 
of these races, no vote was recorded.
As Ellis Jacobs noted in “Spoiled Ballots: Under and Overvotes in the 2004 General Elec-
tion in Montgomery County, Ohio,” in the 33 precincts in Dayton in which voters saw 
this ballot rotation, approximately 2.6% of all voters overvoted. This compares to just 
1.1% of voters in Dayton that saw other rotations.46 
As with other confusing ballot designs, low-income and minority voters were dispro-
portionately affected by this problem. Of the 20 precincts with the highest residual vote 
rates, 17 were in Dayton, where the median household income was $27,423 (compared 
to $46,015 for the rest of the county), 23% of individuals lived below the poverty level 
(compared to 6.6% for the rest of the county), and 43% were African American (com-
pared to 10% for the rest of the county).47 The precincts most dramatically affected were 
among those with the lowest income.48 
Table 2: Highest Rates of Residual Voting in Dayton, Ohio
Precinct Number Residual Vote Rate
Precinct 14A 15.56%
Precinct 3L 8.47%
Precinct 21B 8.2%
Precinct 22C 7.51%
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The fi rst of these was the Veterans Administration Center where resident veterans voted. 
The second was a precinct full of public housing projects. It is 83% African American. 
The third was “a compact residential neighborhood in North West Dayton bounded by 
Cornell, Wesleyan and Otterbein. The housing there is almost exclusively comprised of 
four unit, single story apartments which appear to be part of a single complex. Many of 
them are boarded up.”49 The area is 91% African American. The fi nal precinct is a resi-
dential area “overlooking the Dayton Tire brownfi eld site.” It is 95% African American. 
All four precincts are “very low income neighborhoods.”50
One obvious lesson of the high residual vote rates created by the rotation described above 
is that everything possible should be done to ensure that the row reserved for disqualifi ed 
candidates is eliminated from all ballots. But even where this is impossible, there are steps 
that might be taken to avoid some of the problems that occurred in Montgomery Coun-
ty. It is quite possible that if offi cials in Montgomery County had conducted the kind of 
usability testing discussed in Policy Recommendations, they would have discovered what 
became obvious after the election was over: that the particular rotation that left “Candi-
date Removed” in the middle of the contest was likely to cause some voters to overvote. 
At that point, election offi cials could have made extra effort to alert all voters that “Can-
didate Removed” in the list of candidates in the Presidential race represented the place on 
the ballot that Ralph Nader’s name would have appeared had he not been disqualifi ed, 
and that voters should cast only one vote among the remaining four candidates.
They also could have conducted testing of alternatives to determine whether other solu-
tions might have improved voter performance. For example, they could have placed an 
instruction like “Vote for ONE of these four sets of candidates” in the empty slot.
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When voters look at a ballot, they must be able to identify separate voting tasks and differ-
entiate between races and ballot measures. Font size and weight and care in layout discussed 
above contribute to a more detailed visual organization of a ballot. Designs that incorporate 
improper text formatting often induce voters to inadvertently skip races. We have detailed 
the problems that arose in Sarasota County in 2006 after that county deployed a ballot 
that displayed different contests on the same page. Usability experts have identifi ed another 
problem with the Sarasota County ballot: inconsistency in the format and style of each 
DRE page.51 
Many problematic ballot designs present voters with an inconsistent design that leads 
to mistakes. The butterfl y ballot used in Palm Beach County was poorly designed; the 
fact that it was inconsistent with how other contests were presented made matters worse. 
Displaying the names of Wisconsin gubernatorial candidates in two columns on ballots, 
Kewaunee County in 2002 probably confused voters — even more so, because the guber-
natorial race was the only one displayed this way. Finally, discussed later this report, voters 
are often confused by inconsistent appearances of sample and actual ballots.
Of course, ballot designers should not aim for consistently bad design. But a lack of con-
sistency in ballot design or election materials like sample ballots should be a warning sign 
to election offi cials and concerned members of the public.
Problem 6 Inconsistency in format and style
Example: Inconsistent Headings
Sarasota County, Florida
2006 General Election
Affected Race: 
U.S. Representative
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 13.9%
Residual Vote Rate (in Cong. district)  2.5%
Residual Votes (in county) 18,413 votes
Margin of Victory (in Cong. district) 369 votes
The problem: The fi rst page of the Sarasota ballot had just one race, with the header “Con-
gressional” highlighted in blue. Many voters acting on visual clues provided in the fi rst page 
expected there to be but one contest on the following pages as well.
The inconsistent application of this formatting from page to page could have caused many 
voters to focus immediately on the gubernatorial race and miss the Congressional race 
displayed above it.
We’ve seen other problems with a lack of ballot format consistency in the past.
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Sarasota County, Florida, Offi cial Election Ballot
Page 2 of 21
Page 1 of 21
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Example: Inconsistent Headings
Los Angeles County, California
1976 General Election
Affected Race: U.S. Senate
The problem: The offi ce title and voting instructions for the presidential race on the 1976 
Los Angeles County ballot were listed above the candidates’ names, whereas for the U.S. 
Senate race, the offi ce title and voting instructions appeared to the left of the candidates’ 
names, where it was less likely to be noticed.
The result: Not surprisingly, while the residual vote rate for president in Los Angeles 
County was relatively low at 4%, it was an astounding 17.2% for the Senate race, with 
436,864 votes not counted. This loss of votes was larger than the statewide margin of vic-
tory for Republican Senate candidate S.I Hayakawa, who won by only 246,111 votes. In 
contrast to Los Angeles County, the residual vote rate for the Senate race in the rest of the 
state was just 4.1%.
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 17.0%
Residual Vote Rate (in rest of state) 4.1%
Residual Votes (in county) 436,864 votes
Margin of Victory (in state) 246,111 votes 
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Problem 7 Not using shading to help voters 
differentiate between voting tasks
Proper shading and clear borders between ballot items help voters easily identify separate 
voting tasks and differentiate between races and ballot measures. Failure to shade offi ce 
titles, for instance, can make differentiating between races diffi cult, as we see in this ballot 
from Escambia County, Florida in 2002.
Example: Headings with No Shading
Escambia County, Florida
2002 General Election
Affected Race: Attorney General
Residual Vote Rate (in Escambia County) 2.5%
Residual Vote Rate (in Bay County) 2.2%
Affected Race: Commissioner of Agriculture
Residual Vote Rate (in Escambia County)    4.6%
Residual Vote Rate (in Bay County)      4.3%
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Escambia County, Florida Ballot        Bay County, Florida Ballot
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The problem: Against a plain white background, Escambia County voters likely found it 
diffi cult to distinguish between the Congressional, Gubernatorial, Attorney General and 
Commissioner of Agriculture races. A better ballot design would use shading to distin-
guish between voting tasks.
The result: Perhaps unsurprisingly, the residual vote rate for certain “unshaded” statewide 
contests in Escambia County were higher than in nearby Bay County that did use shad-
ing to differentiate offi ce types. The residual vote rate for the Attorney General contest in 
Escambia County was 2.5%, as compared to 2.2% in Bay County. The residual vote rate 
for the Commissioner of Agriculture contest in Escambia County was 4.6%, as compared 
to 4.3% in Bay County.
The solution: The improved Escambia County ballot uses different shading to denote 
different options. The ballot shades offi ce titles and candidates’ names differently; this 
visually separates the various voter tasks. The re-designed ballot also illustrates the recom-
mendation to use the “fi ll in the oval” response style.
The ballot as it was used: The ballot with shading added:
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Re-designed Ballot:
Write In
Congressional
State
Represenative in Congress
District 1
Vote for One
Jeff Miller
Republican
Bert Oram
Democratic
Write In
Write In
Governor/Lieutenant Governor
Vote for One
Jeb Bush / Frank T. Brogan
Republican
Bill McBride / Tom Rossin
Democratic
Attorney General
Vote for One
Charlie Crist
Republican
Buddy Dyer
Democratic
Commissioner of Agriculture
Vote for One
Charles H. Bronson
Republican
David Nelson
Democratic
Robert Kunst  / Linda Milkowitz
NPA
County
County Commisioner
District 2
Vote for One
Bill Dickson
Republican
Ron Melton
Democratic
Yes
Nonpartisan
Judicial
Justice of the Supreme Court
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
District Court of Appeal
Sample Ballot
Official General Election Ballot
Escambia County, Florida
November 5, 2002
• Vote Fill in the Oval next to your choice
• Use only the marking device provided or a number 2 pencil
• If you make a mistake, ask for a new ballot
• To vote for a candidate whose name does not appear on the ballot, 
   fill in the oval next to the dotted line and write in the name of the candidate. 
Bonnie M. Jones
Supervisor of Elections
Room 400, County Courthouse
Telephone: 559-3900
Shall Justice Harry Lee Anstead 
of the Supreme Court be retained 
in office?
Shall Justice Charles T. Wells 
of the Supreme Court be retained 
in office?
Shall Judge Robert T. Benton of 
the First District Court of Appeal 
be retained in office?
Shall Judge Margueritte H. Davis 
of the First District Court of Appeal 
be retained in office?
Shall Joseph Lewis, Jr. of the 
First District Court of Appeal be 
retained in office?
Shall Judge Ricky L. Polston of 
the First District Court of Appeal 
be retained in office?
Shall Judge William A. Van Nortwick, 
Jr. of the First District 
Court of Appeal be retained in office?
The re-designed ballot includes our recommendation 
for the use of fi ll-the-oval instead of complete-the-arrow 
response method. Not all machines can read ovals.
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Problem 8 Not using bold text to help voters 
differentiate between voting tasks
Ballots should also use bold-faced text to help voters differentiate between offi ce titles and 
candidate names. A comparison of the 2002 general election ballots used in Franklin and 
Douglas Counties, Illinois demonstrate the problems that can arise from improper use of 
bold type.
Example: Use of Bold Text
Franklin County, Illinois
2002 General Election
The problem: The Franklin County ballot does a good job of differentiating the different 
types of races with the use of shading. But it is diffi cult for voters to differentiate contests 
within each type. Multiple races are listed below the “Statewide” heading, however, both 
offi ce titles and candidate names are displayed in bolded text. As with the failure to 
properly use shading, the lack of variation in text formatting, which in this case, is with 
the use of boldfaced text, may fail to alert voters of new voting tasks that require 
their attention.
In contrast, in the same election, Douglas County, Illinois used bold-faced text properly 
to assist voters in differentiating between offi ce titles and candidate names. The use of 
shading and bolded text on this ballot provides multiple levels of visual differentiation 
between voting tasks which helps voters, as they scan the ballot page, to refocus their at-
tention each time that they are presented with a new voting task.
The result: The difference in residual vote rates in these two counties may be instructive. 
Residual vote rates were generally lower in Douglas County than in Franklin County in 
2002 for statewide races. For instance, in the Attorney General contest, the residual vote 
rate was 3.6% in Franklin County and 3.1% in Douglas County. In the Secretary of 
State contest, the residual vote rate was 4.0% in Franklin County and 3.0% in 
Douglas County.
Affected Race: Attorney General
Residual Vote Rate (in Franklin County) 3.6%
Residual Vote Rate (in Douglas County) 3.1% 
 
Affected Race: Secretary of State
Residual Vote Rate (in Franklin County) 4.0%
Residual Vote Rate (in Douglas County) 3.0%
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Franklin County, Illinois Ballot          Douglas County, Illinois Ballot
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Problem 9 Not writing short, simple instructions
When confronted with a confusing design, voters may turn to instructions for guidance. 
Carefully worded instructions can help voters discover and correct errors. Poorly writ-
ten and formatted instructions can cause problems for even the most experienced voters. 
These voters tend to skip dense instructions, assuming that they know what they are do-
ing, and as a result, may miss changes in instructions from contest to contest.52 
Good instructions (clearly and simply written, and located in the right place on a bal-
lot) can help voters avoid making mistakes altogether, while poorly written instructions 
can compound voters’ confusion, making it more likely they will not cast their votes as 
intended.
In order to be useful, instructions must be easy to understand. Unnecessarily complicated 
language confuses voters. Instructions are best understood if the context is provided be-
fore the action, and if they are written in the active voice at a low reading level.
Example: Long, Confusing Instructions
Kansas
2004 General Election
Affected Race: President
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 2.3%
Residual Vote Rate (nationally)   1.1%
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The problem: The text of these ballot instructions from come from the Kansas Election 
Code.53 “Deface” and “wrongfully mark” are needlessly complicated ways of saying “make 
a mistake.” Because they supply more words than necessary, the instructions are spread 
across multiple lines. The center alignment of the instructions is also problematic. Unlike 
typical left-aligned text, the longest line of centered text, instead of the line of text listed 
fi rst, grabs a reader’s attention.
The result: Kansas’ ballot designs tend to be more confusing than those used in other 
states.54 This may explain why Kansas had a higher residual vote rate of 2.3% in the 2004 
presidential election — well above the national average of 1.1%. There are many possible 
explanations for this rate, including an electorate disinclined to vote in the presidential 
race, or poor poll worker training or voter education. But Kansas offi cials should not rule 
out the possibility that these mandated instructions, as well as other legal requirements 
that violate basic principles of good ballot design (see p. 67 for further discussion) may 
have contributed to the high residual vote rate.
A solution: Good ballot instructions, written at a low reading level, must use commonly 
understood words to clearly and simply state how voters should make selections on the 
ballot. They should be left-aligned to ensure that voters easily read them in the correct 
order. Better instructions might read as follows:
 
To vote, fi ll in the oval next to your choice, like this:
To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, write the person’s full name
in the blank space, and fi ll in the oval next to it.
If you make a mistake or want to change your vote, ask a poll worker for a new ballot.
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Problem 10 Placing instructions far from related actions
David Kimball, Martha Kropf and Janice (Ginny) Redish all suggest that instructions 
should be placed immediately before the group of contests to which they apply.55 Kimball 
specifi cally recommends that they be at the top of the fi rst column of the fi rst page, rather 
than across the top of the fi rst page.56 Redish suggests that instructions be placed near the 
contests they affect, and in relevant order.57
Example: Long, Confusing Instructions
Los Angeles County, California
2008 Presidential Primary Election
Affected Race: President
Residual Vote Rate (in county)           5.3%
“Lost” Nonpartisan Votes       12,013 votes
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The problem: On February 5, 2008, “decline-to-state” or nonpartisan voters,58 in Los 
Angeles County, California who went to polling places to vote in the Democratic or 
American Independent presidential primaries (as they were entitled to do), were confront-
ed with an inherently confusing voting process that defi ed common sense.59 Voters told 
poll workers which primary they wanted to vote in, were handed a nonpartisan ballot and 
directed to voting booths with voting devices that contained the contests for the party 
primary they selected to participate in. However, these voters still had to fi ll out an oval 
indicating their party choice before voting in partisan contests. If they failed to fi ll in that 
oval, votes cast for party contests would not count, despite the fact that these voters had 
already stated what party primary they were participating in. Only nonpartisan contests 
would be read by the County’s ballot card readers. Not surprisingly, many voters did not 
understand this and their votes in the presidential primary contest were lost.
In Los Angeles County, the ballots used for all of the party primaries consisted of just 
numbered spaces — no candidate names or ballot questions appeared directly on the ballot. 
Contest and candidate names appear separately on a vote recorder, that the voter inserts the 
ballot into. In Los Angeles, Democratic candidates, rotating in position by State Assembly 
District, were assigned to bubbles #8-15; American Independent candidates, also rotating, 
were assigned to bubbles #8-10. So bubbles #8-10 on nonpartisan ballots could been votes 
for either party. To tell one from the other, voters were supposed to fi ll in a different bubble 
— bubble #5 or 6 — with their party choice.
This is an unusual step in the voting process. Not surprisingly, many voters would have 
been baffl ed even with clear and well-placed written instructions. But there should be 
little doubt that the confi guration of the ballot instructions made it far less likely that 
nonpartisan voters would understand the importance of fi lling in the oval indicating their 
party choice.
 
VOTERS REGISTERED WITH DEMOCRATIC PARTY
SKIP TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE’S CONTEST BELOW
TO VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES, NONPARTISAN VOTERS
MUST FIRST SELECT PARTY IN THE BOX BELOW
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While the Los Angeles County ballot did list instructions for nonpartisan voters at the 
top of the ballot immediately above the #5 and #6 bubbles, it failed our ballot instruction 
guidelines in two ways. First, the instructions were not listed in an order that correspond-
ed with the order of the voting tasks — fi lling in the party bubble, followed by making a 
selection in the presidential preference race. The relevant instructions for the fi rst voting 
task — fi ll in the party bubble — were listed second. The fi rst instruction on the ballot 
instead says, 
“Voters registered with the Democratic Party, skip to presidential preference’s 
(SIC) contest below.”
No doubt, many nonpartisan voters simply followed this fi rst instruction. By placing an 
instruction relevant to the second task above the fi rst task, offi cials probably confused 
some voters. Many nonpartisan voters probably read the fi rst instruction telling voters to 
skip ahead to the second box, and did so, especially if they did not understand the impor-
tance of being registered with a party.
The second instruction, relates to the fi rst task. It says:
“To vote for Democratic candidates, nonpartisan voters must fi rst select 
party in the box below.”
It would have been better and clearer to reverse the order of the two instructions, or 
to present only one instruction, relevant to the fi rst box: 
“Voters not registered with a political party must fi ll in bubble #5 or #6.”
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The result: Offi cials in Los Angeles County appeared to be aware that this ballot and 
set of instructions could confuse voters. Los Angeles offi cials made signifi cant efforts to 
instruct poll workers to make nonpartisan voters aware of the additional bubble to fi ll, 
and aired radio public service announcements the day before and day of the election.60 
But, despite these efforts, of the total 226,081 nonpartisan ballots cast in Los Angeles 
County, 60,458 did not have bubble #5 or 6 fi lled out, but did have votes for partisan 
contests, leaving election offi cials without a voter statement of which primary these voters 
were participating in.61 48,525 of these ballots were counted in supplemental ballot counts 
based on criteria established by county election offi cials, however 12,013 partisan contest 
votes on nonpartisan ballots ultimately could not be counted and were excluded from the 
offi cial certifi cation of election results.62
The extraordinary effort by Los Angeles County election offi cials to discern the voter 
intent of 80% of the mismarked ballots is commendable. However, these problems could 
have been avoided if the instructions were better. In total, 5.3% of the votes cast by non-
partisan voters were not counted — not because voters over- or undervoted, but because 
they did not follow fairly confusing instructions and their choice could not be determined 
from the ballots they cast.
Learning from this lesson, Los Angeles County election offi cials have revamped the voting 
process for nonpartisan voters in party primaries. With readability and usability in mind, 
Los Angeles offi cials redesigned the process by adding two nonpartisan ballots for voters 
who wish to vote in party primaries. The ballots have been pre-marked to identify the party, 
no longer requiring the voter to make the mark themselves. Additionally, Los Angeles worked 
with community organizations and representatives of the local political parties to redraft the 
instructions to voters, in order to ensure instructions were clearer and more readable.63
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Example: Instructions on a Separate Paper From the Offi cial Ballot
Cuyahoga County, Ohio
2004 General Election
Absentee Ballots
Affected Race: President
Residual Vote Rate (absentee, in county) 3.3%
Residual Vote Rate (in-precinct, in county) 1.7%
Margin of Victory (in state)  2.1%
Although instructions directed voters to make selections based on the numbers, many 
absentee voters were misled by arrows mistakenly printed in the booklet that suggested 
that voters should line their punch-card ballots with the candidates’ names and make 
selections based on them instead of the numbers.65 
Another example of problems that can result when instructions and actions are separated 
can be found in the absentee ballots used by Cuyahoga County, Ohio in 2004.
The problem: In this case, more than 75,000 voters were presented with instructions and 
candidates in a booklet separate from a paper ballot containing just numbers and spaces.64 
Candidates’ names were assigned corresponding numbers that voters were supposed to 
fi nd and punch out on the ballot. The ballot book’s instructions state:
To Vote for President and Vice-President,
punch the hole beside the number
for the set of candidates of your choice.
Your vote will be counted for each of the
candidates for presidential elector
whose names have been certifi ed to the
Secretary of State.
(Vote not more than ONCE)
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The result: There was an unusually high residual vote rate for the presidential contest — 
3.3% of all absentee votes in the county (or close to 3,000 votes) as opposed to a 1.7% re-
sidual vote rate for in-precinct voters in the county (in-precinct voters were not given this 
confusing ballot). The margin of victory between George Bush and John Kerry in Ohio 
in 2004 was just 2.1%; it is not diffi cult to imagine the fi restorm that might have resulted 
in Ohio if the confusing absentee ballot used in Cuyahoga County were used statewide, 
and the residual vote rate exceeded the margin of victory between the two Presidential 
candidates.
Absentee Ballot Page                                              Absentee Punch-Card Ballot
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Problem 11 Not informing voters how to correct 
paper ballots 
The Help America Vote Act requires all voting equipment to “provide the voter with the 
opportunity . . . to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and 
counted.”66 Unfortunately, ballot design and instructions can make it diffi cult for voters to 
correct errors, and thus discourage them from correcting mistakes.
It is easy for paper ballots to become “spoiled” in ways that make it diffi cult to record a 
voter’s intended choices. A voter might accidentally select the wrong candidate, a stray 
mark from the pen might graze the wrong candidate’s name, or the paper itself might tear. 
When ballots do not have these instructions, the results can be unusually high residual 
vote rates.
Example: No Instructions for How to Correct a Mistake
Lincoln County, Tennessee
2002 General Election
Affected Race: U.S. Senate
Residual Vote Rate (in county) 3.9%
Residual Vote Rate (in state) 3.0%
The problem: The ballots in Lincoln County, Tennessee did not have any instructions about 
how to correct a ballot.
The result: The residual vote rate for the U.S. Senate race in Lincoln County was 3.9%. 
That compares to a rate of 3.0% statewide.
The solution: Ballot instructions must warn voters about the consequences of a spoiled 
ballot. Instructions in simple, clear language, in the upper left-hand corner of the ballot 
should inform voters of what to do when a ballot is spoiled. Such instruction might say, 
“If you make a mistake or want to change your vote, ask a poll worker for a new ballot.”
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Problem 12 Failing to effectively warn voters of 
undervotes in touch screen systems
When DREs produce high undervote rates (as in Sarasota County, Florida’s Congressional dis-
trict race in 2006), an obvious question is why more voters didn’t notice when they reviewed 
a “summary screen” after they’d made their selections that their votes for a particular race had 
not been recorded. Summary screens allow voters to review the selections the machine has 
recorded, as well as contests where no vote has been recorded, and provide voters with an op-
portunity to change their selections (or in the case of undervotes, cast votes in races they may 
have accidentally skipped) before casting the ballot. 
There has been limited research on vote verifi cation systems and how to make summary 
screens more usable.  But the area is ripe for further research. Even without much study, it is 
obvious to usability experts who have studied DREs that summary screens on most DREs 
could be improved. The summary screen for ballots in Sarasota County in 2006 supplies 
examples of standard review screen fl aws.
Example: Poor Summary Screen Instructions 
Instructions
Return to any contest
by touching the contest title. To cast your
ballot now, press the
VOTE button.
The problem: It is unclear what this page is, or what voters are supposed to do once they reach 
this page. This screen violates many of the basic usability principles of electronic ballot design 
discussed in the example checklist in this report. The instructions are not clear and simple; 
they use the passive rather than the active voice; single instructions sprawl over many lines, 
while two different instructions share the same line; and the instructions are center-aligned 
rather than left-aligned on the page.
The solution: A simple instruction explaining what voters are to do once they reach this page 
would be enormously helpful. A better set of instructions would be:
Review your ballot selections carefully.
To change a selection, touch the contest title.
To cast your ballot, press the VOTE button.
57
Sarasota County, Florida 2006 Summary Ballot Screen
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Problem 13 Publishing sample ballots different from
actual ballots
Sample ballots serve as a type of voting instruction by allowing voters to familiarize 
themselves with the layout of contests and candidates and different voting tasks. 
As such, they should look like the ballots that voters will use on Election Day.
2006 Sarasota County Sample Ballot
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2006 Sarasota Election Day Ballot
One of the factors that may have contributed to problems in Sarasota County, Florida 
in 2006 is that sample ballot that voters saw before the election looked very different 
from the confusing ballot used on Election Day. With no way to review the real ballot in 
advance, almost all voters saw the confusing Sarasota ballot layout for the fi rst time when 
they were in the voting booth.
Had the county widely distributed sample ballots that looked like the actual ballots vot-
ers would see on Election Day, there are several reasons to believe that the residual vote 
rate might have been lower. Among them: civic groups and concerned citizens may have 
noticed the problems with the ballot and insisted on a redesign or reprogramming of the 
electronic ballot; even if it was too late to change the electronic ballot, these groups could 
have spent the weeks leading up to the election warning voters of the potentially confus-
ing design; and, fi nally, voters themselves would have had an opportunity to familiarize 
themselves with this unusual design.
Laws that 
Interfere with 
Good Design 
and Usability
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State laws and regulations, often drafted by lawyers and others with little familiarity 
with basic usability principles, are frequently written in ways that discourage good ballot 
design. In fact, such laws often mandate designs that make it far more diffi cult for voters 
to accurately cast votes for their choices. We encourage states to use this report and work 
with usability experts to determine which current laws and regulations in their states may 
prevent counties from designing the most usable ballots.  Illinois did this in 2001; at the 
encouragement of usability experts, the State Legislature revoked its requirement for the 
use of capital letters in ballots.69 
More generally, overly prescriptive laws, as opposed to laws that set minimum goals and 
provide for the creation of administrative rules to reach those goals, can lock in bad ballot 
designs in a way that cannot be corrected without diffi cult-to-obtain legislative action. It 
is our consensus that election codes should mandate layout rules, as well as standard and 
simple voting instructions for each voting system model. In addition, such codes should 
set out general requirements for visual acuity needed to read the ballot and for the reading 
level of the words used in instructions (i.e., “using simple English words no higher than 
a third grade reading level”).70 But the code should direct the chief state elections offi ce to 
adopt administrative rules to carry out these laws.
Of the states we reviewed, three stood out as having the kind of laws that typically im-
pede good ballot design: New York, Ohio, and Kansas.
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A. New York
New York State’s election code and regulations violate more basic usability principles than 
any other state we examined. As New York makes its transition from lever machines to 
optical scan systems,71 the problems caused by such requirements are likely to become 
more apparent. Among the violations are the following:
Requirements for full-face paper ballot. The New York State Board of Elections has 
found the state’s election code requires a full-face ballot display for all ballots, except that 
“proposals may appear on the reverse side of any [paper] ballot.”72 Several usability experts 
have convincingly argued that requiring a full-face ballot design listing every candidate 
and contest on a single screen or piece of paper is likely to cause voter confusion and 
higher voter error rates because voters are presented with too much information at once.73 
More specifi cally, the full-face requirement for paper ballots in New York is particularly 
problematic in light of the fact that such ballots often contain several candidates and par-
ties listed for each offi ce, and because there are additional requirements to list additional 
information next to each candidate’s name, including party emblems. The result is, all too 
often, a crowded, diffi cult-to-read ballot encourages mistakes.
 Requirement to include party name and emblem in each box. While a full-face ballot 
is likely to place all candidates of a single party in a single row or column (with a title that 
will state “Democrat,” “Republican,” or other party name), New York law additionally 
requires each candidate’s name to be surrounded by both party emblem and party name 
(again).74 In such cases, little if any additional information is provided to voters, but each 
candidate’s name will become surrounded by so much information that the ballot itself is 
likely to be more diffi cult to read.
Requirements for capital letters. New York’s election code states, “the names of can-
didates shall be printed in capital letters.”75 This violates the basic usability principle of 
avoiding setting text in all capital letters.
Complex instructions. Like many other ballot instructions mandated by law, instructions 
drafted for New York’s paper ballots rely heavily on legal and election-related jargon, and do 
not seem to have been drafted to ensure that low-literacy individuals will be able to under-
stand them. Worse still, the law permits the placement of instructions on the “edge” of the 
ballot, rather than mandating that instructions appear in the upper left-hand corner of the 
ballot. The mandated instructions for paper ballots state in relevant part:
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1   Mark only with a pen having blue or black ink or with a pencil having black lead.
2   To vote for a candidate whose name is printed on this ballot make a single 
cross X mark or a check V mark in one of the squares to the right of an emblem 
opposite his or her name.
3   To vote for a person whose name is not printed on this ballot write or stamp his or 
her name on a blank line under the names of the candidates for that offi ce.
4   To vote yes or no on a proposal make a single X or V mark in the square opposite 
your vote.
5   Any other mark or writing, or any erasure made on this ballot outside the voting 
squares or blank spaces provided for voting will void this entire ballot.
6   Do not overvote. If you select a greater number of candidates than there are va-
cancies to be fi lled, your ballot will be void for that public offi ce or party position.
7  If you tear, or deface, or wrongly mark this ballot, return it and obtain another. 
Do not attempt to correct mistakes on the ballot by making erasures or cross 
outs. Erasures or cross outs may invalidate all or part of your ballot. Prior to 
submitting your ballot, if you make a mistake in completing the ballot or wish to 
change your ballot choices, you may obtain and complete a new ballot. You have 
a right to a replacement ballot upon return of the original ballot.
These instructions violate a number of rules provided in our sample checklist. They are 
negative, repetitive, unnecessarily long, and use needlessly complex words and election 
jargon. Simpler, plainer, and positive instructions could be written as follows:
1   To vote, use the pen or pencil provided to completely fi ll in the square next to 
your choice, like this: 
2   To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, write the full name in the 
Write-in area at the bottom of the column for that offi ce.
3   Vote only for the maximum number of candidates for each offi ce. The number 
of candidates you can vote for in each offi ce is listed at the top of the column for 
that offi ce.
4   If you make a mistake or if you want to change your vote, ask a poll worker for a 
new ballot.
Original
Rewritten
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B. Ohio
Ohio’s election code appears to confl ict with at least three basic usability principles 
detailed in our sample checklist; however, as discussed below, the Secretary of State may 
override some of the provisions that confl ict with good ballot design.
Requirement that candidate names appear in all capital letters.76 Writing text in ALL 
CAPITAL LETTERS is usually intended to give that text more visual weight on the page, 
making each of the letters larger. When printing technologies did not allow the use of dif-
ferent typefaces (for example, varying the size or weight of the text), this may have been 
helpful. Today, it is no longer necessary. There are two problems with the use of all capital 
letters. First, and most importantly, most text encountered in day-to-day life is written 
with both capital and lower-case letters. We are used to reading mixed-case text, so it is 
more familiar. The second problem is that when text is written in upper-case, all of the 
letters are the same size, so we lose the natural variations in the overall shape of the words. 
The problems connected with all upper-case formatting have been studied and recognized 
for decades.77 The Ohio Election Code provides that the Secretary of State may modify 
requirements related to case type for both candidate names and offi ce titles.78
Requirement that certain text (and in particular, certain contest names) be centered, 
rather than fl ush-left.79 Centering of text, particularly contest names, can be confusing 
for voters, especially those with visual and reading disabilities who would benefi t from a 
clear starting point that fl ush-left text provides.  Although the Ohio Election Code pro-
vides that certain text be centered, it also appears to allow the Secretary of State to modify 
this requirement and allow for all text on the ballot to be fl ush-left.80
Complex instructions for only one race. The Ohio code mandates detailed and confus-
ing instructions for the presidential race,81 while providing different instructions for other 
contests and non-presidential ballots.82 The mandated instruction for the presidential race 
is as follows:
 Below “Offi cial Presidential Ballot” shall be printed a heavy line centered between 
the side edges of the ballot. Below the line shall be printed “Instruction to Vot-
ers” centered between the side edges of the ballot, and below those words shall be 
printed the following instructions:
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1    To vote for the candidates for president and vice-president whose names are 
printed below, record your vote in the manner provided next to the names of such 
candidates. That recording of the vote will be counted as a vote for each of the 
candidates for presidential elector whose names have been certifi ed to the secre-
tary of state and who are members of the same political party as the nominees for 
president and vice-president. A recording of the vote for independent candidates 
for president and vice-president shall be counted as a vote for the presidential 
electors fi led by such candidates with the secretary of state.
2    To vote for candidates for president and vice-president in the blank space 
below, record your vote in the manner provided and write the names of your 
choice for president and vice-president under the respective headings provided 
for those offi ces. Such write-in will be counted as a vote for the candidates’ 
presidential electors whose names have been properly certifi ed to the secre-
tary of state.
3    If you tear, soil, deface, or erroneously mark this ballot, return it to the precinct 
election offi cers or, if you cannot return it, notify the precinct election offi cers, 
and obtain another ballot.
These instructions are long, needlessly complex sentences, that collect too many ideas 
into one paragraph. They also contain legal language such as “electors” and “recording 
a vote” which may not be meaningful to voters. The instructions explain that when you 
vote for president and vice president, you are really voting for a “presidential elector” 
(representative to the Electoral College).
Better instructions would be:
1    To Vote for President and Vice-President, mark your choice next to 
their names.
2    If you vote for candidates who are listed with a political party, your vote will be 
counted as a vote for the presidential electors from that party.
3    If you vote for candidates who are listed as independents, your vote will be 
counted as a vote for the presidential electors supporting those independent 
candidates.
4    If you make a mistake or want to change your vote, ask a poll worker for 
a new ballot.
 
Original
Rewritten
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By contrast, Ohio law mandates only the following related instructions for other races 
and ballots:
 The board of elections shall cause to be printed in English in twelve point type on 
paper or cardboard instructions as issued by the secretary of state for the guid-
ance of electors in marking their ballots. Such instructions shall inform the voters 
as to how to prepare the ballots for voting, how to obtain a new ballot in case of 
accidentally spoiling one, and, in a smaller type, a summary of the important sec-
tions of the penal law relating to crimes against the elective franchise. The pre-
cinct election offi cials shall cause to be posted immediately in front of or on the 
polling place and in each voting shelf one or more of such cards of instructions.
 The result of vague statewide rules about ballot instructions for certain races could lead to 
very different instructions in each county, even where counties are using the same equip-
ment, and that is likely to lead to signifi cant differences in whether a voter’s vote will be 
counted from one county to the next. It would be better to use simple and clear instruc-
tions for all ballots and all races. They might mirror the mandated instructions in Ohio 
for the presidential contest, but apply to all contests, using simpler, plainer and positive 
language:
To vote, mark your choice next to the candidate’s name.
 If you make a mistake or want to change your vote, ask a poll worker for 
a new ballot.
Original
Rewritten
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C. Kansas
As already discussed in Problem 9, the election code in Kansas supplies language for 
instructions that is long and confusing. In addition to these problematic laws, Kansas’s 
election code also has requirements that create clutter around candidates’ names. Specifi -
cally, Kansas Statutes Section 25-613 requires ballots to list, among other things, the 
city of residence for each candidate running for statewide offi ce. More clutter will gen-
erally make it more diffi cult for voters, particularly voters with reading disabilities, to 
distinguish between candidates and contests. As Professor Ted Selker of MIT has noted, 
roughly 15% of the population has some sort of reading disability, and such people “get 
really confused easily with disorganization of text.” 81
 
Policy 
Recommendations
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There are a number of steps states and counties can take to make their ballots as usable as 
possible. Unless these steps are taken, it is inevitable that large numbers of voters will be 
disenfranchised as a result of poor ballot design and confusing ballot instructions in Novem-
ber. In the worst case scenario, the number of disenfranchised voters will exceed the margin 
of victory between the leading candidates in a federal or statewide contest and lead to the 
kind of recriminations and loss of public faith in election administration that we saw after 
the 2000 Presidential Election and 2006 race in Florida’s Congressional District 13. Unfor-
tunately, our review of state practices, and interviews with election offi cials in all fi fty states, 
shows that few, if any of these steps are being taken in most jurisdictions today.
There is still adequate time to implement many, if not all, of these measures. But that 
time is quickly running out.
These recommendations fall into two groups:
Improve the ballot design and usability process to ensure that ballots capture voter 
intent accurately
Improve election laws, regulation and reporting
Improve the ballot design to capture voter intent accurately
Develop a checklist of design best practices for ballot designers
A good checklist can help those responsible for designing ballots ensure that they have 
not violated any basic usability or information design principles (as all of the problematic 
ballots in this report did). We provide a starting point for such checklists. These 
checklists are designed to help election offi cials and designers create well-organized, easily 
comprehensible paper and electronic ballots that allow voters to cast their intended votes 
effi ciently and effectively.
We encourage election offi cials to work with design and usability professionals to tailor 
these checklists to their jurisdictions, based upon their own experiences and the require-
ments of their voting systems and their local election laws.
Several reports from the EAC and others offer more detailed guidance on both ballot lay-
out and writing instructions. We have referred to them throughout the work in preparing 
this report, but urge election offi cials to follow their well-researched guidance.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Effective Designs for the Administration of Federal 
Elections (June 2007)
David Kimball & Martha Kropf, Ballot Design and Unrecorded Votes on Paper-Based Bal-
lots 69 Public Opinion Quarterly 505 (2005)
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Janice Redish, Guidelines for Writing Clear Instructions and Messages for Voters and Poll 
Workers (prepared for the National Institute of Standards and Technology) (Feb. 21, 
2006)
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Recommendations to the Election Assistance 
Commission (prepared at the direction of the Technical Guidelines Development Com-
mittee) (Aug. 31, 2007)
Paul S. Herrnson et al., Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot 
(Brookings Institution Press 2008)
Conduct usability testing: use the LEO test kit to improve ballot design
Using the sample checklist provided in this report and reviewing the examples of bad and 
good ballot design described above, election offi cials can avoid making the most common 
ballot design mistakes. But usability problems can occur, even if you try to follow good 
design guidelines. Ultimately, the best way to ensure that the voter’s intention is accu-
rately recorded is to conduct usability testing on proposed ballots before fi nalizing their 
design for use in an election.82 
Of course, all ballots will eventually receive a usability test — on Election Day. At that 
point, unfortunately, fi nding out that a ballot is confusing to voters is most unwelcome 
news. Our hope is that by testing ballots before Election Day, election offi cials can make 
adjustments to ballots and avoid the kinds of design problems that result in lost or 
miscast votes. Usability testing will only have value if election offi cials make changes to 
ballots based on the results of that testing.
The Brennan Center surveyed the chief election offi ces and election code of all fi fty states. 
We did not fi nd any state offi ces that currently conduct usability testing on ballots before 
Election Day, though several election offi cials expressed interest in doing so in the future. 
It is likely that many (if not most) states and counties have not conducted such testing 
because they believe they do not have the time, money, or personnel needed to do it ef-
fectively. And to some extent, they are probably right: unfortunately, for most election 
offi ces there will not be suffi cient resources to conduct regular, rigorous, scientifi c testing 
of ballots before every election.
But a recently developed usability testing kit for local elections offi cials, called the “LEO 
Usability Test Kit”83 should allow states and counties to learn quickly and inexpensively if 
their ballots have major fl aws that are likely to leave the intended choices of many voters 
uncounted.
The Usability Professionals’ Association Voting and Usability Project created this testing 
kit and suggests using it under the following circumstances:
 When something about the voting situation has changed since the last election, such as 
new machines, a new ballot layout, the passage of new regulations, or ordinances;
71
When offi cials have a good idea of what is going to be on the ballot for the next 
election; and
When some signifi cant event happens that may cause the overall layout of the ballot to 
change.
The process for testing ballots and making necessary modifi cations can be found at the 
Usability Professionals’ Association website.84
The tests themselves are easy enough that they can be administered by anyone who might 
serve as a poll worker, and they require only about a dozen or so volunteers to act as voters. 
These people could be visitors to the election offi ce or people who work nearby (but not 
in the elections or other government offi ce). The sessions can be held in any central, public 
place, such as a town hall or city hall, or any place similar to a regular poll site. For elections 
that are conducted entirely by mail, offi cials should simulate a home-like set-up, such as a 
kitchen or living room.
The volunteers should refl ect the demographics of the voters in that jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, if a jurisdiction includes many elderly voters, taking the materials to the neighborhood 
center where elderly residents congregate would be a good idea. Testing with middle-aged 
workers would not be representative for that jurisdiction.
Testing must involve not just observing whether or not individuals fi ll out the ballot cor-
rectly, but whether comments or hesitancy while voting indicate that the ballot is more diffi -
cult or confusing than it needs to be. In all likelihood, a small group of voters involved in a 
usability test will mostly be able to work through their confusion and/or correct mistakes on 
their own. In the context of a full election, however, the problems experienced by the small 
usability test group are likely to be magnifi ed, and the subtle effects of poor design are more 
likely to be signifi cant.
If done properly, the entire process of testing should not take more than a few hours, and 
should provide election offi cials with greater confi dence in their ballot design, or allow them 
to make changes that will make it more likely that voter intent is accurately recorded.
Actively publicize sample ballots that look like the ballots voters will use at 
their polling places
States and counties should publicize ballots ahead of an election, by sending them to local 
party leaders, business leaders, non-profi t organizations, civil rights groups, universities, and 
others. These sample ballots should also be posted on the web and mailed to all registered 
voters. If sample ballots show the same layout and design as the actual ballots used at the 
polling place, early publicity will provide voters with an opportunity to become familiar 
with the ballot, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will make errors on Election 
Day. By providing sample ballots to a wide range of groups ahead of time, election offi cials 
increase the likelihood that they will be warned of ballot design fl aws before Election Day, 
giving them an opportunity to change the ballot and/or educate voters about potential prob-
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lems when they arrive at polling places to vote. Unfortunately, as we saw with the example of 
Sarasota County in 2006 (discussed in Ballot Design Problems), all too often sample ballots sent 
to voters and advocacy groups do not look like the ballots used on Election Day.
If usability testing or publication of sample ballots identifi es problems with ballot 
design, make necessary changes
In our historical review of poor ballot designs that led to high numbers of lost or miscast 
votes, we found that recognizing ballot design fl aws was not enough to prevent big problems 
on Election Day. For instance, election offi cials in Sarasota County in 2006 and Los Angeles 
County in February 2008 appeared to have known there were problems connected to ballot 
design and did their best to warn voters of the fl aws.85 In spite of this, thousands of votes were 
lost. It is preferable to warn voters of design fl aws than to ignore them, however, in the best 
case scenario, counties should conduct usability tests and publish sample ballots early enough 
so that if problems are discovered, the fl awed ballot design and/or instructions can be changed.
Create ballot design guidelines and templates for each brand and model of voting 
system used
We have reviewed the election code and state practices of all fi fty states. Only Florida’s Sec-
retary of State has developed detailed ballot design regulations for each brand and model of 
voting system used in his state.86 In many states, counties design ballots for elections. Although 
many states provide general guidance as to the form of ballot instructions and the listing of 
contests and/or candidate names, they are often not specifi c enough to ensure that the ballot 
design mistakes discussed in Ballot Design Problems do not occur. The variety of voting systems 
used necessitates, at a minimum, specifi c guidelines for each type of voting system (e.g., opti-
cal scan, touch screen) or ballot class (e.g., absentee, provisional) to ensure that ballots are as 
well-designed as possible to minimize voter confusion. We encourage all states to consult with 
usability experts in designing sample ballots, and to publish templates for counties as well.
Review county ballot designs at the state level
A general principle in both the graphic design and programming communities is that it is 
extremely diffi cult for someone who created a design to review it effectively.87 Mandating state 
oversight and approval of ballot designs would ensure that a “second set of eyes” in the offi ce 
of the Secretary of State or other chief election offi cial reviews a sampling of ballots from every 
county (for instance, one for each type of machine used in each county, or for each class of 
ballot, i.e., absentee, in-precinct, English and second language, etc.). Ideally, the review would 
be done by a full-time employee or outside expert who would not be as overburdened with 
as many other tasks as a county election offi cial is shortly before an election. Connecticut, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin regularly review locally-designed ballots 
at the state level before elections.88 In Ohio, the Secretary of State has asked counties to send 
in ballots for review if they fi nd they must deviate from that offi ce’s ballot template (because, 
for instance, their particular model of voting system cannot support all aspects of the design 
detailed in the template).89
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Improve Election Laws, Regulations, and Reporting
Require counties to publish the number of overvotes, undervotes, 
and spoiled ballots
Unusually large numbers of overvotes, undervotes, and/or spoiled ballots strongly suggest elec-
tion administration problems; in particular, high rates of overvotes, undervotes, and spoiled 
ballots may suggest some ballot design feature confused voters to the point where they were 
unable to cast their votes as intended. Many states reported collecting little to no information 
on the number of overvotes, undervotes, and/or spoiled ballots, or collecting it for internal 
purposes only. We recommend that states require counties to collect this information and 
to publish it publicly. Florida requires county supervisors of elections to report the number 
of overvotes and undervotes in the top-of-the-ticket races for every general election, which 
is published in a public report by the state.90 This information is not only useful to election 
offi cials for examining their ballot designs, but as a public report, concerned citizens and advo-
cates may also participate in the process.
Review and amend election laws that prevent best ballot design
We encourage states to use this report and work with usability experts to determine which 
current laws and regulations in their states may prevent counties from designing the most us-
able ballots. Overly prescriptive laws, as opposed to laws that set minimum goals and provide 
for the creation of administrative rules to reach those goals, can lock in bad ballot designs in a 
way that cannot be corrected without diffi cult-to-obtain legislative action. It is our belief that 
election codes should mandate layout rules, as well as standard and simple voting instructions 
for each voting system model.
Adopt federal voting system guidelines that ensure future machines will support 
good ballot design
The federal government should encourage voting equipment manufacturers to support re-
quirements that support good ballot design. Many election offi cials who want to comply with 
a checklist such as the one provided in this report will have a hard time doing so because of the 
limited capacity of their own voting equipment. In reviewing and amending the draft Volun-
tary Voting System Guidelines, the EAC should do more to ensure that all future voting systems 
can employ good ballot design and usability principles. We could start by requiring vendors to 
produce systems that satisfy the recommendations in the EAC’s own Effective Designs for the 
Administration of Federal Elections.
Put a greater emphasis on ballot design in the EAC’s role as a clearinghouse
Part of the mandate of the Election Assistance Commission is to “serve as a national clearing-
house and resource for the compilation of information and review of procedures with respect 
to the administration of Federal elections.”91 In fulfi lling this duty, the EAC could post copies 
of paper ballots or screenshots of DRE pages from each county on its website. This would al-
low election offi cials around the country to see how other states and counties address challeng-
ing ballot issues through ballot design.
Directions 
for the Future
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This report addresses steps that jurisdictions can and should take in the short term to 
improve ballot design and avoid the kinds of mistakes we have seen in nearly every federal 
election in recent memory. We offer a few suggestions below for further study and approaches 
that, we hope, will greatly improve ballot design and instructions in the long run.
A. Increased role of federal government
This report shows that ballot design decisions of local and state election offi cials can have a 
major impact on federal election results. The federal government has an interest in ensuring 
that voters are not disenfranchised as a result of confusing ballot design and instructions. In 
addition to the recommendations already discussed, there are a number of steps that could be 
taken at the federal level to ensure better ballot design. These include: federal guidelines for 
ballot design for each model of voting system used in the United States, and funds that would 
enable states and counties to conduct usability testing of ballots.
B. More cooperation between election offi cials and usability and other 
design experts
Ultimately, the best way for counties and states to improve their ballot design and instructions 
is to work with usability and other design experts. Some jurisdictions have begun to do that. 
Cook County, Illinois is a prime example of how cooperation between election offi cials and 
design and usability experts can lead to better laws and better, more usable ballots. See generally, 
Blair Kamin, The (Design) Fix Is In; In a Stunning Turnabout, Chicago and Cook County Have 
Become National Leaders in Election Reform, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 16, 2004. The Oregon 
Secretary of State’s offi ce has employed a full-time designer to assist with the redesign of all 
voting materials, and Nebraska has participated in a pilot project testing ballot design that re-
sulted in constructive insight on ballots’ usability.92 We encourage more jurisdictions to adopt 
this model of cooperation and more participation by usability and design experts at election 
offi cial conferences.
C. Study of summary ballot screens
DREs and many new precinct count optical scan systems have summary screens that inform 
voters if they have undervoted in particular contests (and in the case of optical scan systems, 
that they have overvoted). Unfortunately, there has been little study of what kinds of instruc-
tions, layout, and design work best to ensure that voters review summary screens, spot errors, 
and make corrections when necessary.93 A better understanding of what works could greatly 
reduce voter error rates.
D. Design of VVPT output and how to make voters review before 
they fi nally cast ballots
Soon after the Help America Vote Act passed, opposition to electronic voting and touch screen 
machines grew. Many election integrity activists and security experts argued in favor of 
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voter-verifi able paper trails (“VVPT”), printed by the electronic voting machines that would 
allow voters to independently verify their vote.94 More recently, some of these activists and 
security experts have argued that paper trails do not provide suffi cient security, because most 
voters do not carefully review them (or notice errors, even when they do).95
One of the most persistent questions for those who study voting system usability, security 
and reliability is how to design voter-verifi able paper trails so that voters will carefully review 
them. As the Brennan Center and others have demonstrated, paper trails will make a vot-
ing system more secure and reliable only if a minimum number of voters review them and 
notice whether their choices are accurately refl ected on the paper trail.96 However, there has 
been surprisingly little scientifi c study to determine how many voters review their paper 
trails and how effective they are as a tool to catch errors.
E. Study of effect of alternative voting systems
Increasingly, jurisdictions around the country are looking at alternative voting systems, 
including instant runoff voting, fusion voting, and proportional representation. While all 
of these systems merit consideration, they can present new challenges for simple ballot 
design. As an example, San Francisco adopted instant runoff voting in 2002, but it only 
applies to city and county races.97 Everything else on a voter’s ballot is represented as a 
traditional election. Mixing voting systems in the same election and on the same ballot 
can present the kind of confusing inconsistencies previously discussed in this report. In 
addition to conducting usability testing on ballots employing alternative voting systems, 
election offi cials would greatly benefi t from fully understanding how such systems might 
affect the ability of voters to accurately cast their votes.
F.  Use templates/checklists to support the updating of 
local election laws
Appendix A contains a sample checklist for ballot designers and recommends that states 
develop templates for ballot design based on the different models of voting equipment used 
in the state. The EAC’s Effective Designs for the Administration of Federal Elections can help 
election offi cials develop such templates. It would be of great help to local legislators, elec-
tion department legislative liaisons and election offi cials if attorneys and usability experts 
worked together to determine what local legislation and regulations needed to be amended 
to foster good ballot design.
G. Reconsider the straight-party ballot feature
Fifteen states still have an option on the ballot that allows voters to cast a straight-party 
ballot with one mark. While this feature obviously can simplify the process for voters who 
only intend to cast a straight-party ticket, recent studies show that the straight-party feature 
confuses voters and leads to more voting errors.98
Conclusion
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Literacy tests to gain access to the polls were banned in the United States in 1965 with 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act.99 But in November 2008, eight years after an 
election debacle of historic proportions, millions of voters across the United States will 
face a literacy test of a different sort after they’ve stepped into the voting booth. Their 
intended choices may be recorded only if they can understand instructions written at 
a high reading level, often using legal and election terminology. And they will only be 
counted if they successfully navigate ballot designs that are needlessly complicated, where 
candidates for the same offi ce may be listed on multiple columns or pages, or different 
contests are inconsistently formatted.
As we have tried to demonstrate in this report, ballot design and instructions can have 
a huge impact on election results. We sampled some of the more “high profi le” ballot 
design disasters over the last several years; this is not a comprehensive analysis of the cost 
of poor ballot design on elections and votes counted. But, the examples illustrate how 
dramatically poor ballot design can affect vote totals — particularly when a number of 
design fl aws appear on the same ballot. Not surprisingly, when these mistakes affected 
many ballots (by appearing on a signifi cant percentage of the ballots in large counties like 
Los Angeles or Palm Beach, or on most of the ballots in a particular state), tens of thou-
sands — and sometimes hundreds of thousands — of votes in a single federal or statewide 
race have been lost. This does not even include the voters who may have been so confused 
by a ballot design that they cast their ballot for a candidate for whom they did not intend 
to vote (for obvious reasons, it is far more diffi cult to determine this than to know when a 
voter failed to successfully cast a vote at all).
Better ballot design will make it far more likely that the preferred candidates of all voters 
will be declared winners of their contests.
Palm Beach County 2000 should have been a wake-up call to legislators, election offi cials, 
and watchdog groups that ensuring good ballot design is a critical election administration 
issue that needs to be systematically addressed. Unfortunately, for the last eight years, it 
has continued to be largely ignored. The predictable result has disproportionately affected 
low-income and elderly voters, and thrown several important elections into turmoil.
The good news is that there is still time before November 2008 to ensure that ballot 
design fl aws do not throw the results of another closely contested race into doubt, as 
has happened in several federal and state races in the last decade. And unlike changes to 
equipment (which, there is no question, could make systems more secure, accessible and 
usable), improving ballot design and instructions is possible for little or no cost, and a 
relatively small-scale investment of time.
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State Registered Voters
California 4,718,003
Connecticut 1,740,000
Colorado 374,208
Florida 5,677,783
Indiana 87,639
Iowa 240,824
Kentucky 214,483
North Carolina 133,521
Ohio 1,124,472
Pennsylvania 240,997
Virginia 646,880
Total Nationwide 15,194,476
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California
Del Norte 11,854
Glenn 11,870
Imperial 53,565
Inyo 9,918
Kern 287,672
Kings 44,504
Mariposa 11,196
Mono 6,706
Monterey 147,714
Napa 66,665
Riverside 763,923
San Benito 23,903
San Bernardino 754,978
San Diego 1,369,496
San Joaquin 253,148
Santa Clara 715,492
Shasta 90,700
Sutter 38,525
Tehama 29,473
Yuba 26,731
Colorado
Denver 374,208
Florida
Broward 927,613
Charlotte 115,243
Collier 195,109
Hillsborough 633,115
Indian River 83,470
Lake 178,168
Lee 288,609
Martin 97,239
Miami-Dade 1,122,815
Nassau 44,382
Palm Beach 796,891
Pasco 278,098
Pinellas 613,156
Sarasota 247,250
Sumter 56,625
Indiana
Boone 36,892
Cass 21,768
Parke 12,201
Randolph 16,778
Kentucky
Boyle 19,001
Carlisle 3,931
Christian 37,415
Daviess 64,140
Garrard 11,321
Hardin 61,821
Logan 16,854
North Carolina
Chatham 39,491
Iredell 94,030
Ohio
Cuyahoga 1,053,232
Mercer 26,636
Van Wert 20,192
Putnam 24,412
Pennsylvania
Fayette 89,584
Lackawanna 151,416
Virginia
Fairfax 646,880
 
Number of registered voters in counties in selected states where main voting 
system changed between 2006 and 2008 general elections101
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Registered Voters
Endnotes
83
1 Lawrence Norden et al., THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: PRO-
TECTING ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD (Brennan Center for 
Justice ed., 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/ 
resource/machinery_of_democracy_protecting_elections_in_an_elec-
tronic_world/; EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related 
Equipment, Standards & Testing (Dec. 7, 2007) (prepared by teams 
from Pennsylvania State University, the University of Pennsylvania, 
and WebWise Security, Inc. as part of the EVEREST voting systems 
analysis project initiated by the Secretary of State of Ohio), available 
at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/info/EVEREST/14-AcademicFina-
lEVERESTReport.pdf; Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman & Edward 
W. Felten, Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine 
(Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-
paper.pdf; A. Kiayias et al., Integrity Vulnerabilities in the Diebold TSX 
Voting Terminal (Voting Technology Research Center & Department of 
Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut, July 16, 
2007), available at http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Report-TSX_fi les/
TSXVoting_Terminal_Report.pdf.
2 Another Voting Glitch in Baldwin County, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 14, 
2006; Louis Short, Vote Machine Problems Reported, SUN-TIMES (He-
ber Springs, AR), Nov. 27, 2006; Jeremy Milarsky & Rafael A. Olmeda, 
Broward County, Fla., Fixes Computer Error To Correct Statewide Gam-
bling Vote, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 2004; Dozens of Voters 
Complain About Glitch, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 8, 2006; 
Steve Gunn & Lynn Moore, Election Turns Around When Inspectors 
‘See The Light’, MUSKEGON CHRONICLE, Sept. 4. 2004; Nate Jennings, 
Problem Machines Spur Call for Recount, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Nov. 
14, 2004; Wade Rawlins & Rob Christensen, ‘Winners’ May Be Losers, 
NEWS AND OBSERVER, Nov. 9, 2002; Editorial, Board Should Hold a 
Revote for the City, READING EAGLE, July 20, 2005; Lauren Glendenning, 
Voting Glitch in Fairfax, CONNECTION NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 8, 2006; Jake 
Rigdon, About 600 Medford Ballots Cast in November Ignored, MARSH-
FIELD NEWS-HERALD, Mar. 12, 2004.
3 In reference to voters’ failure to accurately record their intended votes 
in Palm Beach County in 2000, Theresa LePore, Palm Beach County 
Elections Supervisor was quoted as saying, “All through life you have to 
follow instructions. And if you don’t follow instructions . . . .” Justice 
O’Connor also famously appeared to blame the voters of Palm Beach 
County for failing to follow instructions. When questioning David Boi-
es about whether to count certain ambiguous votes, she asked, “Well, 
why isn’t the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for 
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer.” Mark Danner, The Road 
to Illegitimacy, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001.
4 As an example, the alignment of candidate names and their cor-
responding punch card ballot holes on the 2000 Palm Beach County 
butterfl y ballot (see p 20 infra) appeared to make it easier for supporters 
of George W. Bush to accurately record their votes than supporters of 
Al Gore.
5 Email from Sean Flaherty, Verifi ed Voting to Lawrence Norden (June 
20, 2008) (on fi le with the authors).
6 This is an average of the number of voting-age persons who moved 
between 2000 and 2006. Based on U.S. Census Bureau, Current Popu-
lation Survey data on mobility.
7 Associated Press, Historic Election Inspiring Millions of New Voters, 
Survey Finds, CNN.com, May 7, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
POLITICS/05/06/new.voters.ap/index.html.
8 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, EFFECTIVE DESIGNS FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS (June 2007), available at http://
www.eac.gov/election/effective-polling-place-designs; See also MARCIA 
LAUSEN, DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY: BALLOT AND ELECTION DESIGN (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 2007).
9 David Kimball & Martha Kropf, Dos and Don’ts of Ballot Design, AEI/
Brookings Election Reform Project (Oct. 2007), available at http://
www.electionreformproject.org/Resources/314eaad7-6dc9-4dad-b6e4-
5daf8f51b79e/r1/Detail.aspx.
10 PAUL S. HERRNSON ET AL., VOTING TECHNOLOGY: THE NOT-SO-SIMPLE 
ACT OF CASTING A BALLOT (Brookings Institution Press 2008).
11 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Recommendations to the Election 
Assistance Commission (prepared at the direction of the Technical Guide-
lines Development Committee) (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://
www.eac.gov/fi les/vvsg/Final-TGDC-VVSG-08312007.pdf.
12 Email from John Lindback, Oregon Election Director to Lawrence 
Norden (June 2, 2008) (on fi le with the authors).
13 According to the League of Women Voters of New Jersey and the 
League of Women Voters of California, sample ballots are mailed to all 
registered voters in those states prior to each election. League of Women 
Voters of New Jersey, New Jersey Citizens’ Guide to Government (2005), 
http://www.lwvnj.org/guide/voting.shtml; League of Women Voters of 
California, Preparing to Vote, http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/
e3prep.html.
14 See Sample Ballots May Have Added to Confusion, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, available at http://www.sptimes.
com/2006/12/11/State/Sample_ballots_may_ha.shtml, noting that 
the sample ballot sent out in Sarasota County in November 2006 was 
different than the now notorious ballot voters saw on electronic voting 
machines on Election Day.
15 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.032 (2008).
16 Id.
17 Press Release, AIGA, 2007 AIGA Election Design Fellow Selected In 
Oregon (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://www.aiga.org/content.cfm/
press-071022.
18 This practice is required in Florida, for example. FLA. STAT. § 101.595 
(2008). Florida’s Secretary of State has issued re0ports on under- and 
overvotes in federal elections since 2002. They are available on the 
Division of Elections website at: http://election.dos.state.fl .us/reports/
electreports.shtml.
19 Kimball & Kropf, supra note 9.
20 National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride 
and Confi dence in the Electoral Process 53-54 (Aug. 2001), available at 
http://webstorage3.mcpa.virginia.edu/commissions/ comm_2001.pdf.
21 Robert Darcy & Anne Schneider, Confusing Ballots, Roll-Off, and the 
Black Vote, 42 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 347-364 (1989); Stephen 
M. Nichols, State Referendum Voting, Ballot Roll-off, and the Effect of 
84
New Electoral Technology, 30 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW 
106-117 (1998); Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does 
Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 46-60 (2003); Stephen Knack 
& Martha Kropf, Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: 
A County-Level Analysis, 65 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 881-897 (2003); 
Michael C. Herron & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Overvoting and Representa-
tion: An Examination of Overvoted Presidential Ballots in Broward and 
Miami-Dade Counties, 22 ELECTORAL STUDIES 21-47 (2003); David C. 
Kimball et al., Unrecorded Votes and Political Representation, in COUNT-
ING VOTES: LESSONS FROM THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FLORIDA 
(Robert P. Watson, ed., Univ. Press of Florida 2004); R. Michael Alvarez 
et al., Counting Ballots and the 2000 Election: What Went Wrong?, in 
RETHINKING THE VOTE (Ann N. Crigler et al., eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2004); Justin Buchler et al., Punch Card Technology and the Racial Gap 
in Residual Votes, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 517-524 (2004).
22 All data in this report related to residual votes and residual vote rates 
is on fi le with the authors.
23 Don Van Natta Jr. & Dana Canedy, The 2000 Elections: The Palm 
Beach Ballot; Florida Democrats Say Ballot’s Design Hurt Gore, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A1.
24 Note that a combined undervote and overvote rate of more than 1% 
in a presidential election is unusual — which means that in Palm Beach 
County where 462,588 ballots were cast for president, we should have 
expected fewer than 5,000 unrecorded votes in this race. Experimental 
evidence suggests that the butterfl y ballot is a poor design.  Robert C. 
Sinclair et al., An Electoral Butterfl y Effect, 408 NATURE 665 (Dec. 7, 
2000), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v408/n6813/
pdf/408665b0.pdf.
25 Van Natta Jr. & Canedy, supra note 23; John Lantigua, County Of-
fi cial Knew About Ballot Confusion, SALON NEWS, Nov. 9, 2000, http://
archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/11/09/lapore/.
26 Jonathan N. Wand et al., The Butterfl y Did It: The Aberrant Vote for 
Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCI-
ENCE REVIEW 793 (2001). Eighteen other Florida counties also listed the 
presidential candidates in multiple columns or on two ballot pages. The 
large number of overvotes for president in those counties also affected 
the outcome of the 2000 election. See Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Wrong 
Man is President! Overvotes in the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida, 2 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 525 (2004).
27 Danner, supra note 3.
28 Id. 
29 Ballot Differences, available at http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/
BALLOTS.pdf.
30 Kate Zernike, House Democrats To Object to Florida Election Outcome, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A14.
31 David Jefferson, What Happened in Sarasota County?, THE BRIDGE 17, 
19 (Summer 2007), available at http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.
nsf/weblinks/MKEZ-744KWK?OpenDocument; Laurin Frisina et al., 
Ballot Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006 Mid-
term Elections in Florida 7 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL 26 (2008), available 
at http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/ elj.2008.7103.
32 Bob Mahlburg & Maurice Tamman, Dist. 13 Voting Analysis Shows 
Broad Problem, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ article?AID=/20061109/
NEWS/611090343.
33 Maurice Tamman & Matthew Doig, North Port Area Had the Most 
Undervotes, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 2006, at A1.
34 Ballot Differences, supra note 29.
35 Id.
36 Todd Ruger, Voting Glitch Prompts Warning, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2006, at B1; Dozens of Voters Complain About Glitch, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 8, 2006, at A6; Tom Lyons, 18,000 
Reasons To Have a Paper Trail, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 
2006, at B1; Editorial, A Ballot Fiasco?: Sarasota Undervote Too High To 
Be Credible, BRADENTON HERALD, Nov. 10, 2006; Mark K. Matthews, 
Touch-screen Voting Tossed in Sarasota; County Voters Mandated ‘Verifi ed 
Paper Ballots.’  Meanwhile, A Recount Continues, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Nov. 15, 2006, at A1.
37 U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, Results of GAO’s Testing of 
Voting Systems Used in Sarasota County in Florida’s 13th Congressional 
District (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/
d08425t.pdf.
38 U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, Further Testing Could Provide 
Increased but Not Absoute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause 
Undervotes in Florida’s 13th Congressional District (Oct. 2, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0897t.pdf.
39 Iowa will not use “complete-the-arrow” ballots in November 2008. 
Telephone interview with Iowa Secretary of State Michael Mauro, June 
4, 2008.
40 David Kimball & Martha Kropf, Ballot Design and Unrecorded Votes 
on Paper-Based Ballots 69 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 522-526 (2005), 
available at http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/69/4/508.pdf; 
Charles S. Bullock, III and M. V. Hood III, One Person—No Vote; One 
Vote; Two Votes: Voting Methods, Ballot Types, and Undervote Frequency 
in the 2000 Presidential Election 83 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 990 
(2002).
41 Based on a study of 641 counties using precinct count optical systems 
and 767 counties using central count optical scan systems. Data on fi le 
with the authors.
42 The estimated additional residual votes were based on the difference 
between the residual vote rates in Table 1. Based on available data, there 
were 1,881,576 ballots cast on central count optical scan machines with 
the arrow format and 10,730,610 ballots cast on precinct count optical 
scan machines with the arrow format in the 2004 presidential election. 
So, [(1,881,576 * .023) – (1,881,576 * ,016)] + [(10,730,610 * .009 – 
10,730,610 * .006)] = 45,362.
43 Reid Forgrave, Nader’s Name Is on the Ballot, But You Can’t Cast a Vote 
For Him, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 20, 2004, at 5B. 
44 OHIO REV. CODE § 3505.03 (2007).
45 E-mail from Steve Harsman, Director, Montgomery County Board 
of Elections, to Ellis Jacobs, Advocates for Basic Legal Equity (Apr. 28, 
85
2008) (on fi le with the authors).
46 Ellis Jacobs, Spoiled Ballots: Under and Overvotes in the 2004 Gen-
eral Election in Montgomery County, Ohio 4 (Feb. 15, 2005), available 
at http://ohioelection2004.com/WordHost/ montgomeryco4pctsellisja-
cobs.doc.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Ben Bederson, Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting 
a Ballot (PowerPoint presentation slides), available at www.cs.umd.
edu/~bederson/voting/USACM-bederson-feb-2008.pdf.
52 U.S. Election Assistance Commission supra note 8, at 7.21. (“[Di-
verse] Participants often failed to notice that voting instructions 
changed from contest to contest.”). The research team for the EAC 
report anecdotally observed diffi culties caused by confusing or unclear 
instructions for even the most experienced voters participating in the 
studies. Various fi ndings on the impact of instructions language for vot-
ers using touch screen systems can be found at pages 7.37-7.39 of the 
EAC’s report. 
53 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2902 (2007).
54 Kimball & Kropf, supra note 40.
55 Id.; Janice Redish, Guidelines for Writing Clear Instructions and Mes-
sages for Voters and Poll Workers (prepared for the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://vote.nist.
gov/032906PlainLanguageRpt.pdf; Janice Redish, Review of the Gap 
Between Instructions for Voting and Best Practice in Providing Instructions 
(prepared for the National Institute of Standards and Technology) (Dec. 
9, 2005), available at http://vote.nist.gov/instructiongap.pdf.
56 Kimball & Kropf, supra note 40. Ballots in the EAC pilot studies of 
best practices in ballot design followed this advice, placing both verbal 
and visual instructions in the fi rst column.
57 Guidelines for Writing, supra note 55. Review of the Gap, supra note 55.
58 There is a lot of variation in terminology used for “decline-to-state” 
voters (independent, unaffi liated, nonpartisan, etc). This is another 
problem in a highly mobile society, where people may vote in several 
different jurisdictions in their lifetime.
59 Since 2000, California has held “modifi ed” close primaries. Unaffi liat-
ed or “decline-to-state” voters may participate in a party’s primary elec-
tion if authorized by the party’s rules. In California, these voters were 
permitted to cast ballots in the Democratic or American Independent 
primaries, but not the Republican primary. Changes in voting rules 
may make election offi cials’ jobs of designing ballots more complex to 
accommodate different types of voters.
60 Instructions for nonpartisan voters crossing over to vote in the 
Democratic or American Independent party primaries were part of poll 
worker training materials and instructional videos and fi nal mailings 
to Precinct Inspectors the weekend before the election. Memorandum 
from Dean C. Logan, Acting Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/
County Clerk to Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Feb. 11, 
2008), available at http://www.lavote.net/VOTER/PDFS/ELEC-
TION_RELATED/ 02052008_NON_PARTISAN_REVIEW.pdf.
61 Discussion of Problems Faced by Voters at the 2008 Presidential Primary 
Election: Joint Informational Hearing Before the Assemb. Elections & 
Redistricting Comm., S. Elections, Reapportionment, & Constitutional 
Amendments Comm., & S. Select Comm. on Integrity of Elections 
2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2008) (testimony of Dean C. Logan, 
Acting Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk – Los Angeles County), 
available at http://www.lavote.net/VOTER/PDFS/ELECTION_RE-
LATED/ 02052008_RRCC_TESTIMONY.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Email from Efrain Escobedo, Executive Liason, Los Angeles County 
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (June 9, 2008) (on fi le with the 
authors).
64 Editorial, The Return of the ‘Butterfl y Ballot’, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 
29, 2004, at A24.
65 Kaye Spector, Local Ballot Is Confusing for Some Absentee Voters, CLEVE-
LAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 21, 2004, at B3.
66 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2007).
67 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(1)(A) (2007).
68 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, supra note 8; HERRNSON ET AL., 
supra note 10.
69 H.B. 1914, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. No. 41 (Ill. 2001).
70 For examples of appropriate vocabulary, see Guidelines for Writing, 
supra note 55.
71 New York State will be replacing its lever voting machines with optical 
scan voting systems with anticipated completion of the transition and 
implementation by May 2009. Todd D. Valentine, Special Counsel, & 
Paul M. Collins, Special Deputy Litigation Counsel, New York State 
Board of Elections, Summary of Revised Plan A Time Line (Jan. 11, 
2008), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/ NYSBOE/hava/
HAVAComplianceSummaryRevisedPlanATimeLine01112008.pdf.
72 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6209.2 (McKinney 2008).
73 See, e.g., David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, Voting Technology, Bal-
lot Measures, and Residual Votes, 36 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH 479 
(2008); HERRNSON ET AL., supra note 10.
74 N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 7-104(4)(a), 7-106(6) (McKinney 2008).
75 N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 7-106(2), 7-114(1)(g) (McKinney 2008).
76 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3505.08, 3505.10 (2007).
77 See, e.g., ROLF. F. REHE, TYPOGRAPHY: HOW TO MAKE IT MOST LEGIBLE 
(Design Research International, Carmel, IN, 1974). (“Words set in all-
caps . . . do not provide specifi c word-shape outlines since they produce 
oblong, uniform word-shape.  No cues can be perceived by the eye, and 
a time-consuming deciphering of the word, letter by letter, is necessary 
... text set in all-caps retards reading speed by about 13%, due to an 
increase in fi xation time, and a corresponding decrease in the number of 
words perceived per fi xations.”)
86
78 OHIO REV. CODE § 3505.10 (2007).
79 Id.
80 OHIO REV. CODE § 3505.12 (2007).
81 Phil Long, Jack Dolan & Marc Caputo, SARASOTA RECOUNT: 
Cluttered Ballot May Be At Fault, Expert Says, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 15, 
2006, at B1. See also Ted Selker, Jonathan A. Goler & Lorin F. Wilde, 
Who Does Better with a Big Interface? Improving Voting Performance of 
Reading for Disabled Voters CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project 
Working Paper #24 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.vote.caltech.
edu/media/documents/wps/vtp_wp24.pdf.
82 Lawrence Norden et al., THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING 
SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY, USABILITY, AND COST (Brennan Center 
for Justice ed., 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
content/resource/the_machinery_of_democracy_voting_system_secu-
rity_accessibility_usability_a/.
83 The LEO usability testing kit was developed in a Usability Profession-
als’ Association workshop at the Michigan State University Usability 
and Accessibility Center.
84 Usability Professionals’ Association, The LEO Kit: Usability Testing for 
Local Election Offi cials, http://www.usabilityprofessionals.org/civiclife/
voting/leo_testing.html.
85 Problems with the ballot layout in Sarasota County were noted during 
early voting, when 17% of ballots recorded no votes for the Congres-
sional district race. County Elections Supervisor Kathy Dent instructed 
poll workers to warn voters not to miss voting in the Congressional 
district race. Tamman & Doig, supra note 33. In Los Angeles County, 
instructions for nonpartisan voters crossing over to vote in the Demo-
cratic or American Independent party primaries were part of poll 
worker training materials and instructional videos and fi nal mailings 
to Precinct Inspectors the weekend before the election. Memorandum 
from Dean C. Logan, supra note 60.
86 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.032 (2008).
87 Designers testing their own designs may be less willing to admit 
defi ciencies. Jakob Nielson, Should Designers and Developers Do Usabil-
ity?, Jakob Nielson’s Alertbox (June 25, 2007), http://www.useit.com/ 
alertbox/own-usability.html. Knowing too much may prevent designers 
from seeing their biases.  In the elections context, a specifi c variant of 
this problem is that election offi cials are too familiar with the terminol-
ogy and process of elections to look at a ballot from the perspective of a 
new or infrequent voter. Frank Spillers, How To Avoid Being Blinded by 
Your Own Design: Seeing the Forest for the Trees, Demystifying Usability 
(June 1, 2005), http://experiencedynamics.blogs.com/site_search_us-
ability/ 2005/06/dr_usability_sa.html.
88 Email from Ted Bromley, Connecticut Secretary of State’s Offi ce (June 
12, 2008) (on fi le with the authors); Email from Johnnie McLean, 
Deputy Director, North Carolina State Board of Elections (June 9, 
2008) (on fi le with the authors); Email from Kathy Summers, Elections 
Specialist, Division of Elections, Tennessee Secretary of State (June 
10, 2008) (on fi le with the authors); Email from Barbara C. Cockrell, 
Director of Operations, Virginia State Board of Elections (June 11, 
2008) (on fi le with the authors); Email from Steve Pickett, Election 
Specialist – Local Election Administration, Government Accountability 
Board – Elections Division (June 10, 2008) (on fi le with the authors). 
The Virginia State Board of Elections must approve each county’s ballot 
for layout, design, and content once the county creates it. They do this 
in order to carry out state statutory provisions requiring the SBOE 
to ensure uniformity across state. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-103 (2007). 
Wisconsin counties are not required to submit their ballots to the state 
for approval; however the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board 
– Elections Division reviews ballots for any State and Federal offi ces 
sent to them by the counties.
89 Telephone interview with Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner on May 
9, 2008.
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.595 (2008).
91 42 U.S.C. § 15322 (2007).
92 Press Release supra note 17; U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
Public Meeting, Minneapolis, MN (Apr. 16, 2008) (written statement 
of John A. Gale, Nebraska Secretary of State), available at http://www.
eac.gov/News/docs/public-mtg-08-04-16-08-minneapolis-mn-testimo-
ny-sec-john-gale/attachment_download/fi le.
93 One exception is the EAC team who did study this issue, resulting in 
recommendations found in EFFECTIVE DESIGNS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS. It is the authors’ understanding that a study aimed 
specifi cally at instructions and messages on ballots is underway at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Also, this was the subject 
of doctoral dissertation. Sarah P. Everett, The Usability of Electronic 
Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be Changed Without Detection 
(May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University), available 
at http://chil.rice.edu/research/pdf/ EverettDissertation.pdf.
94 Norden et al., supra note 1.
95 Everett, supra note 93.
96 Norden et al., supra note 1.
97 Dean E. Murphy, New Runoff System in San Francisco Has the Rival 
Candidates Cooperating, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A1.
98 HERRNSON ET AL., supra note 10; Richard G. Niemi & Paul S. Herrn-
son, Beyond the Butterfl y: The Complexity of U.S. Ballots, 1 PERSPECTIVES 
ON POLITICS 317 (2003).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2007).
100 Email from Sean Flaherty, Verifi ed Voting to Lawrence Norden (June 
20, 2008) (on fi le with the authors). Numbers of registered voters are 
from 2008, as reported on state election offi cials’ websites.
101 Email from Sean Flaherty, Verifi ed Voting to Margaret Chen (June 
27, 2008) (on fi le with the authors). 144 towns in Connecticut changed 
their primary voting systems since 2006. 19 counties in Iowa (Ap-
panoose, Clay, Clayton, Fayette, Jackson, Keokuk, Lucas, Mahaska, 
Marion, Mitchell, Monroe, Plymouth, Poweshiek, Ringgold, Union, 
Warren, Wayne, Winnebago, and Worth) changed their primary voting 
systems since 2006.
Vote
 2008
Brennan Center for Justice
at New York University School of Law
161 Avenue of the Americas,  12th fl oor
New York, New York 10013
212.998.6730  Fax 212.995.4550
www.brennancenter.org
